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 Discrimination in the judiciary reached a new level of public salience as white police 
officers shot unarmed black youths throughout the 2010s, yet faced no consequences in the 
courts. No less alarming, African Americans form 40% of the total correctional population 
despite comprising 13% of the U.S. population.1 Movements like Black Lives Matter attest to 
mounting frustration with the judiciary’s role in these trends. Against this backdrop, a better 
camouflaged form of discrimination impedes justice just as much, but without the same publicity. 
Jury discrimination prevents minorities, women, and members of the LBGTQ community from 
enjoying their constitutional right to jury service. Defendants suffer equally, for discrimination 
excludes jurors who share their backgrounds from their juries. Diverse juries reach verdicts 
more objectively than their homogenous counterparts, for a given juror must temper her group-
derived predilections to work harmoniously with co-jurors from backgrounds different than her 
own. The judiciary must eradicate jury discrimination if it is to treat jurors and defendants with 
true impartiality. 
 Jury discrimination’s chief mechanism is the peremptory strike. During voir dire, 
attorneys pose questions to prospective jurors, or venirepersons, to determine whether any 
venirepersons are too biased to render an impartial verdict. Attorneys ask venirepersons 
whether they know the defendant, whether they have had any negative experiences with the 
judiciary, and whether they believe they can be impartial. Certain answers typically prompt more 
specific lines of questioning. Venirepersons deemed too partial to sit on a jury may be removed 
from the venire panel - that is, the assemblage of venirepersons - either by a challenge for 
cause or a peremptory strike. Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory strikes allow attorneys to 
 
1 Sawyer, Wendy and Peter Wagner March. “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019.” Prison Policy 





strike venirepersons at will without explaining their reasoning to presiding trial judges. Federal 
jurisprudence prohibits peremptory strikes only on the basis of intentional discrimination on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, or gender. But even these prohibitions are hopelessly weak in their 
current form, for opposing counsel and trial judges rarely have sufficient evidence to argue or 
determine that a peremptory strike’s proponent intended to discriminate. Further complication 
arises when unconscious bias leads counsel to use peremptory strikes discriminatorily without 
even realizing. Many upstanding attorneys believe in civil rights and abhor discrimination of any 
kind, yet unconsciously harbor prejudices that can inform their well-intentioned decisionmaking. 
We must bear in mind that discriminatory outcomes do not require the involvement of willful 
discriminators. 
A Brief History of Jury Discrimination Reform at the Federal Level 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Duren v. Missouri (1978) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986), with 
their respective jurisprudential progenies, comprise the federal judiciary’s modern contribution to 
fighting jury discrimination. Until Duren, excluding venirepersons based on gender and race had 
been commonplace and without serious challenge. The Court’s Hoyt v. Florida (1961) 
unanimously condoned jury discrimination against women. The Hoyt Court felt discrimination 
was justified to shield women from the “filth, obscenity, and obnoxious atmosphere... of the 
courtroom."2 By contrast, the Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) Court concluded that “if [women] are 
systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section 
requirement cannot be satisfied.”3  
Duren built on this foundation by ruling that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of “an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, together mandate that juries be drawn from 
 
2 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
3 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
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a “fair-cross section” of a jurisdiction’s community. Defense counsel can “[establish] a prima 
facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” to counteract the discriminatory denial of 
such a jury by opposing counsel or by a statute. In order to establish a prima facie violation, the 
defendant must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the 
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is 
not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that 
this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection 
process.”4 Duren targeted discriminatory venireperson selection statutes. Before voir dire, a 
court selects residents of its jurisdiction to appear on a venire panel. State-level statutes govern 
this stage of jury selection. Many such statutes have explicitly or surreptitiously excluded 
minorities and women from venire panels. Duren abolished this form of discrimination on paper; 
whether a venire selection statute excludes protected classes is harder to determine than the 
Duren Court foresaw.  
Peremptory strikes, which decide a jury’s makeup after venire selection, are Batson’s 
territory. Batson, while far more influential than its predecessors, was not the first decision to 
prohibit discriminatory peremptory strikes. Hernandez v. Texas (1954) concerned a Mexican-
American petitioner who was systematically denied a jury containing jurors of his race, albeit not 
by the use of peremptory strikes. The Hernandez Court ruled, “When the existence of a distinct 
class is demonstrated, and it is shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that 
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the 
Constitution have been violated.” Moreover, “Petitioner had the constitutional right to be indicted 
and tried by juries from which all members of his class were not systematically excluded.”5 
Though the Hernandez Court considered only venire selection statutes, this language 
presumably applied to peremptory strikes, which can “systematically exclude” “members of [a] 
 
4 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1978). 
5 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
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class.” Peremptory strikes definitively entered the picture in Swain v. Alabama (1965), after 
defendant Swain’s prosecutor’s peremptorily struck every African American on the venire. 
Swain argued that this instance, as well as the same prosecutor’s history of similar misconduct 
in previous cases, amounted to a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Hernandez. 
Ruling for the prosecutor, the Court nonetheless admonished: 
[W]hen the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the 
crime, and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who 
have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for 
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes 
on added significance... These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or justify.6 
 
Discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, then, were held to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment if and only if they were found to be part of a multi-case history of prosecutorial 
discrimination. This placed on peremptory strike opponents - that is, counsel opposing a given 
peremptory strike - a crippling burden of proof. It was nearly impossible to prove that a 
prosecutor had used peremptory strikes discriminatorily over the course of multiple cases, 
especially in jurisdictions that kept incomplete records. Strike opponents needed a framework to 
prove discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in the course of a single voir dire.  
State courts parted ways with Swain well before the U.S. Supreme Court. The California 
Supreme Court’s People v. Wheeler (1978), ruling on the permissibility of a prosecutor’s strike 
of every black venireperson during voir dire, drew up a three step procedure by which: (1) strike 
opponents advance a prima facie case that certain venirepersons were struck “because of their 
group association rather than because of any specific bias;” (2) strike proponents “show if [they] 
can that the peremptory challenges in question were not predicated on group bias alone,” 
including a requirement that strikes be related to the “to the particular case on trial or its parties 
or witnesses;” and (3) “if the court finds that the burden of justification is not sustained as to any 
of the questioned peremptory challenges, the presumption of their validity is rebutted.”7 Unlike 
 
6 Id. 
7 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978). 
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Swain, Wheeler allowed strike opponents to challenge a peremptory strike in the context of a 
single voir dire without investigating a given strike proponent’s conduct in previous cases. 
Wheeler thus lowered the strike opponent’s burden of proof relative to Swain. Challenging 
discriminatory peremptory strikes became feasible, albeit still extremely difficult, for California 
litigants. Even so, strike proponents could easily invent a justification for their strike related “to 
the particular case on trial” if they had in fact meant to discriminate. Unconscious bias also fell 
completely beyond Wheeler’s reach. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, unaware of 
or unconcerned by these shortcomings, adopted a framework much like Wheeler in 
Commonwealth v. Soares (1979).8 Jury discrimination reform had begun a slow but sure upward 
trajectory that continues today. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Batson with California and Massachusetts as its 
models. At the trial level, defendant Batson’s counsel moved to discharge the jury on the 
grounds that the State had peremptorily struck all four black venirepersons to secure an all-
white jury. Counsel advanced an argument based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
right to a jury drawn from a “fair cross-section of the community.”9 The trial judge dismissed the 
motion and defendant Batson was convicted. Batson ultimately found relief in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Thirty-two years after the Hernandez Court ruled the discriminatory use of peremptory 
strikes unconstitutional, the Batson Court finally issued a three-step framework to enforce that 
ruling: 
[1] [A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the 
petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the 
defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at  430 U. S. 494, and that the prosecutor has 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, 
the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory 
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate."  Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. at  345 U. S. 562. Finally, the defendant must show that these 
facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to 
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race… [2] Once the defendant makes a 
prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for 
 
8 Commonwealth v. Soares 377 Mass. 461 (1979). 
9 Duren had, of course, affirmed this right nine years earlier. 
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challenging black jurors… related to the particular case to be tried. [3] The trial court then will have the 
duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.10 11 
 
Batson’s three steps, which overruled at the federal level Swain’s requirement that a 
strike’s discriminatory character be proven through a multi-case inquiry, resembled their 
Wheeler and Soares predecessors without copying them precisely. Step one’s prima facie case 
of “an inference” of discrimination improves on, but nonetheless draws from, Wheeler’s prima 
facie case of a “‘strong likelihood’ of discrimination.” The “neutral explanation” required at 
Batson’s step two, however, was novel, and has long been an especially difficult area of Batson 
interpretation. Too many step two explanations are of indeterminate neutrality. Worse, as under 
Wheeler, strike proponents can invent satisfactory step two explanations to mask discrimination. 
The Court’s main, vague guidance on weighing the proponent’s step two explanation against 
the opponent’s prima facie case was for “the trial court [to] consider all relevant circumstances.” 
This falls woefully short of a bright line rule to inform the trial judge’s ruling at step three. Hence 
only the appeals process constrains a judge’s step three determination. Depending on one’s 
perspective, the trial judge’s step three leeway may seem sensible or inordinate. As for 
apportionment of the burdens of proof, Batson replaced Swain’s crippling burden with a still-
onerous requirement that opponents prove purposeful discrimination. Yet discrimination is not 
always purposeful. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments obligate us to reform accordingly. 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence famously called for the peremptory strike’s complete 
abolition, contending, “Merely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not end the illegitimate use 
of the peremptory challenge.” A judge’s own unconscious racism, Marshall continued, could so 
bias him in the strike proponent’s favor that a Batson challenge would have no hope of success. 
Marshall took particular issue with step two. A strike proponent’s “easily generated [step two] 
 
10 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
11 The bracketed numbers, my own addition, demarcate each of the three steps for clarity. 
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explanations” could mask discriminatory motives, conscious or unconscious, such that “the 
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.” Marshall’s final argument for the 
peremptory strike’s abolition was the precedence that a venireperson’s Fourteenth Amendment 
rights take over counsel’s merely statutory right to the peremptory strike.12 
Though unswayed by Marshall’s dissent, the Court revised the Batson framework fairly 
regularly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Edmonson v. Leesville Construction Company 
(1991) extended Batson’s purview to civil trials. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) further 
extended the Batson framework to peremptory strikes made solely on the basis of sex. 
Hernandez v. New York (1991) and Purkett v. Elem (1995) jointly comprise the most significant 
alteration to Batson. The Hernandez Court held that at step two, “the issue is the facial validity 
of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”13 This language contradicts the 
original Batson requirement that a strike proponent’s step two explanation be “related to the 
particular case to be tried.” The “issue” at step two, then, went beyond “facial validity” under 
Batson’s original terms.  
The Purkett Court doubled down on this reinterpretation of step two.  Purkett’s defense 
counsel raised a Batson challenge during voir dire after the prosecutor struck two African 
American men. The prosecutor explained, "[venireperson] number twenty-two… appeared to me 
to not be a good juror for... the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, 
unkempt hair... And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and goatee type beard... And 
the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me." Needless to say, a venireman’s physical 
appearance has no bearing on his ability to render an impartial verdict. But an uninspired 
discriminator might think of no better pretext to advance at step two. Therefore, such a 
tangentially related explanation merits stricter scrutiny than does an explanation concerning a 
 
12 Batson v. Kentucky, Marshall, J., concurring. 
13 Hernandez v. New York, 500 US 352 (1991). 
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venireperson’s voir dire responses. Moreover, as flimsy an explanation as the aforementioned 
prosecutor’s could hardly rebut a true prima facie case of discrimination.  
The Purkett Court ruled otherwise: “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of 
the justification becomes relevant—the step in which the trial court determines whether the 
opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” This 
language distorts the original Batson requirement of a related race-neutral reason at step two. 
Refer to the block quote above of Batson’s original three steps, and note that the relevance 
requirement is not part of step three but of step two.14 The Purkett majority justified its ruling by 
claiming that its “warning [that a step two explanation must be related to the case at hand] was 
meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely 
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith.” But this is 
nonsense. “Related to the particular case to be tried” was one of the few unambiguous dicta in 
the original Batson opinion. It begged no interpretation, much less reinterpretation. A reason 
related to a given case is one that involves the case facts, one or more of the parties to the 
case, or a venireperson’s ability to be impartial. A venireperson’s hair, curly, unkempt, or 
otherwise, involves none of these things; is thus unrelated; and, accordingly, cannot pass 
muster under Batson’s original step two. Purkett’s majority was literate enough to know the 
meaning of the word “related.” That it fallaciously reinterpreted the Batson Court’s use of this 
word suggests either carelessness or intentional diminishment of Batson’s protections. Either 
way, the result is the same: strike proponents can disguise discriminatory peremptory strikes 
with whatever absurd, pretextual step two explanations suit their fancies. Batson’s “related” 
requirement had put up a pitiful wall against pretextual explanations; Purkett removed even this 
meager threat to the peremptory strike’s uninhibited use. 
 
14 I encourage curious readers to inspect the full Batson decision, so they can see for themselves that the 
“related” requirement indeed falls under step two. 
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 Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) seems on its surface to counterbalance Purkett by expanding 
the number of “relevant circumstances” a trial court can properly consider. The Miller-El Court 
ruled that the trial court, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
“blink[ed] reality” by finding no “clear and convincing evidence” of discrimination by Miller-El’s 
prosecutors. Comparison of questions posed to black and white venirepersons, statistical 
analysis demonstrating the removal of 91% of black venirepersons, and the prosecutors’ own 
“notes of the race of each potential juror” compelled a ruling in Miller-El’s favor.15 The Court’s 
citation of these forms of evidence does laudably help trial courts determine what counts as a 
relevant circumstance. The Miller-El Court did not, however, require trial courts to consider 
these forms of evidence; nor did it draw up a list of “relevant circumstances,” or even define this 
term. Commentators who consider Miller-El an antidote to Purkett, then, fail to see the former’s 
narrow scope. Purkett’s far-reaching pronouncements about how to conduct a Batson inquiry 
remain more potent than the fact-specific Miller-El decision. Conscious and unconscious 
discrimination can hide as easily as ever behind Purkett’s curtain. 
 Johnson v. California (2005) is the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent Batson case to 
have broken new ground. The California Supreme Court had approved the trial court’s ruling 
against Johnson’s Batson challenge on the ground that defense counsel had not proven at step 
one that prosecution had “more likely than not” struck black venirepersons discriminatorily. But 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s “more likely than not” standard impermissibly 
placed a higher burden of proof on the strike opponent than Batson’s original step one 
requirement of a prima facie inference of discrimination.16 Though Johnson is laudable for 
theoretically prohibiting state courts from increasing the strike opponent’s burden of proof at 
step one, that burden remains nearly insurmountable in all but the most blatant cases of 
 
15 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231 (2005). 
16 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005). 
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discrimination.17 Snyder v. Louisiana (2008), Foster v. Chatman (2016), and Flowers v. 
Mississippi (2019) made only shallow changes in the Batson jurisprudence, reaffirming existing 
tenets instead of filling gaps. 
Literature Review 
Commentators tend to deal with the two consitutional approaches to jury discrimination 
reform - Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, governed by Batson, and Sixth Amendment 
fair cross-section, governed by Duren - separately. Slusser et al. (1996), a guide to Batson 
inquiries in federal court, note that strike opponents cannot rely solely on the number of minority 
venirepersons struck; attorneys must supplement their numerical observations with a thorough 
record of voir dire proceedings, such as the questions asked of minority venirepersons versus 
those asked of whites.18 El-Mallawany (2006) examines the effect Johnson v. California (2006), 
arguing that this decision allowed less persuasive prima facie cases to pass muster at step one. 
A higher prima facie threshold could result in more persuasive prima facie cases and, 
consequently, more successful Batson challenges.19 
Many authors have cited Purkett v. Elem (1995) as a deathblow to Batson’s already 
ineffective three step process. Critics predicted as much even before Purkett’s effects were 
clear, and later writers have found those initial predictions prescient. Laeser (1998) noted that 
clever attorneys could fabricate race neutral reasons under Purkett, and that judges were 
having too hard a time determining what constitutes race neutrality for the Purkett system to 
remain tenable. While Laeser did note the potential validity of abolishing peremptories, he also 
 
17 That the strike opponent’s modern burden of proof is lower than Swain’s does not make it readily 
surmountable.  
18 William C. Slusser; David Hricik; Matthew P. Eastus, "Batson, J.E.B., and Purkett: A Step-by-Step-by-Step Guide 
to Making and Challenging Peremptory Challenges in Federal Court," South Texas Law Review 37, no. 1 (January 
1996): 127-160. 
19 Deana Kim El-Mallawany, "Johnson v. California and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims," Fordham Law 
Review 74, no. 6 (May 2006): 3333-3364. 
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examined ways of modifying the peremptory system.20 Burnett (2006) went further, arguing that 
the potential for attorneys to put forth pretextual race neutral reasons at the step two process, 
and the associated difficulty of determining what constitutes a pretext, support the elimination of 
peremptory strike altogether.21 Antony (2005), drawing from psychology, notes that even if an 
attorney believes her race neutral reasons to be genuine, they may be based off of 
subconscious racial stereotypes; neither step two of Batson, nor any federal jurisprudence, 
addresses this potential.22 There are exceptions to the chorus of anti-Purkett critics, mainly 
those who see the peremptory strike as too sacrosanct to reform significantly. Neese (1996) 
praises Purkett for “resuscitating the non-discriminatory hunch” - a strike proponent’s subjective 
discomfort with a venireperson that need not relate to the case facts. According to Neese, 
Batson unacceptably limited non-discriminatory hunches by requiring race-neutral reasons to be 
case-related, thereby mortally wounding the peremptory strike.23 Neese spends little time 
addressing the new potential for discrimination under Purkett as it is secondary to his defense of 
peremptories. Most of those who write about step two, by contrast, are motivated by concerns 
about equal protection, suggesting that Neese’s ideological cohorts are satisfied enough with 
the status quo that they feel little need to argue their views publicly. 
 Commentators have pointed out that although step two fosters jury discrimination, step 
three does allow a trial judge to call out a pretextual race neutral reason and disallow a 
peremptory strike. The problem is that many if not most trial judges refuse to make such a call 
even when the evidence of discrimination is overwhelming. Bennett (2010) observes that “most 
 
20 Jason Laeser, "Jurors and Litigants Beware - Savvy Attorneys Are Prepared to Strike: Has Purkett v. Elem 
Signaled the Demise of the Peremptory Challenge at the Federal and State Levels," University of Miami Law Review 
52, no. 2 (January 1998): 635-660. 
21 Arthur L. Sr. Burnett, "Abolish Peremptory Challenges - Reform Juries to Promote Impartiality," Criminal Justice 20, 
no. 3 (Fall 2005): 26-35. 
22 Antony Page, “Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge.” Boston University 
Law Review 85, no. 155 (2005): 156-261. 
23 D. John Jr. Neese, "Purkett v. Elem: Resuscitating the Nondiscriminatory Hunch," Houston Law Review 33, no. 4 
(Winter 1996): 1267-1282. 
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trial court judges will only find deceit [by strike proponents] in extreme situations.” Bennett also 
expresses concerns that judges, like strike proponents, may harbor unconscious biases that 
could influence step three.24 Choy (1997) identifies step three’s dilemma as a question of how, 
exactly, a judge should determine pretextuality. She advocates four factors - relevance of the 
reason, whether the struck venireperson was questioned, disparities in questioning, and 
disparities in application of the reason - to be used by trial judges in deciding step three.25 Galan 
(2001) notes a case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in which a trial judge’s 
acceptance of the “race neutral” reason for striking a venireperson - that a black McDonald’s 
employee would be overly sympathetic to minorities because of her job - was deemed valid at 
the appellate level.26 Though Galan does not explicitly criticize the opinion, the subtext is clear: 
judges at trial and appellate levels accept likely pretexts at least sometimes. 
 In regard to the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section mandate, commentators tend to 
focus on the statistical degree to which certain minorities are represented. Reil (2007), for 
example, observes that as Hispanic populations grow in the United States, new questions arise 
about whether they are receiving jury summonses at the same rate as other groups. Reil argues 
that the Supreme Court should explicitly confirm that Hispanics are a distinct group for the 
purposes of the Duren test’s first prong. Characterizing the second prong as the “crux” of the 
Duren test, Reil highlights the need for accurate data about the proportion of jury-eligible 
residents in a given district to properly assess “substantial underrepresentation”; collecting such 
 
24 Mark W. Bennett, "Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-
Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions," Harvard Law and Policy Review 4, no. 
1 (Winter 2010): 149-172. 
25 Tracy M.Y. Choy, "Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual under Batson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the 
Role of the Trial Judge in Jury Selection," Hastings Law Journal 48, no. 3 (March 1997): 577-600. 
26 Galan, Thomas. "United States v. Ramirez-Soberanes: Is Sympathy towards Minorities a Race-Neutral Reason 
under Batson v. Kentucky?" Touro Law Review 17, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 679-694. 
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data regarding Hispanics is particularly difficult, as they face language and citizenship barriers 
to eligibility. Finally, Reil considers voter registration lists ideal for drawing venires.27 
 Eades (2001) examined “shows” - potential venirepersons who responded to 
summonses - and no-shows - potential venirepersons who either ignored or did not receive 
summonses - in Dallas County, Texas. Just 2,214 out of 13,612 potential venirepersons 
appeared for jury duty, raising questions about which summonses went undelivered and why 
some recipients ignored their summonses. Eades found serious underrepresentation of “young 
adults (aged 18-34), Hispanic Americans, and “those living in households earning less than 
$35,000 a year.” People in these groups are significantly less likely to get time off of work to 
serve; for example, “The No-shows were three times more likely than the Shows to receive no 
wages at all [during jury duty had they served].” Eades’ consideration of low-income people and 
young adults is atypical both for commentators and courts. Most do not go beyond racial 
minorities. Dallas County’s absolute disparities for Hispanics and low-income persons are 14% 
and 27%, respectively. Eades posits that although courts may find these figures troubling, it 
would be difficult to overcome the state’s retort that officials send summonses to randomly 
selected recipients from names on voter registrations and driver’s license lists. He advises fair 
cross-section claimants to highlight the features of Texas’ jury system, such as the six-dollar-
per-day salary paid to jurors, that “make it so financially onerous that low-income people cannot 
afford to fulfill their civic duty.”28  
 Re (2007) diverges from the statistical framework of other authors and focuses on 
theory. He identifies two conceptions of the fair cross-section requirement. The demographic 
conception, used in all or almost all jurisdictions in the United States, holds that juries should be 
drawn so that “the individuals making up a given petit jury appropriately reflect the demographic 
 
27 Stephen E. Reil, "Who Gets Counted - Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations 
under Duren v. Missouri," Brigham Young University Law Review 2007, no. 1 (2007): 201-258. 
28 Ted M. Eades, "Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County," SMU 
Law Review 54, no. Special Issue (2001): 1813-1826. 
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composition of the overall population.” The ultimate goal according to this conception is 
providing defendants with a “‘fair possibility’ of being judged by a demographically 
representative petit jury.” The enfranchisement conception, which Re advocates, holds that “a 
jury system is fairly cross-sectional when all eligible people have been given adequate—that is, 
fair—opportunity to participate in jury service, regardless of how demographically representative 
the resulting venires or juries may be.” Re’s enfranchisement approach conceives of jury duty 
as a form of democratic participation. Just as an election is considered legitimate when all 
eligible voters have the opportunity to vote, regardless of voter turnout, Re considers the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement satisfied when all those eligible are given an equal 
opportunity to serve on a jury. Re argues that the demographic conception’s measurement of 
the representation of discrete groups is sisyphean, as it is impossible to adequately represent 
each of the countless groups in a given jurisdiction. He further contends that the demographic 
conception actually erodes impartiality by assuming certain groups are predisposed to decide 
cases in certain ways. The enfranchisement conception might also be more effective in 
promoting inclusive juries because courts need not make arbitrary judgments about the 
consequence of statistical figures. Instead of examining, for example, the Hispanic composition 
of a county versus the Hispanic composition of a jury, the enfranchisement conception asks only 
whether anyone, Hispanic or otherwise, has been systematically excluded. If so, there is a 
viable fair cross-section claim.29 
 Many of the authors cited above consider individual state court rulings. Eades, for 
example, provides a window into Texas’ Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. None, however, 
provides a multi-state comparison of jury discrimination approaches. I will distinguish this thesis 
by examining five states. The treatises above also lack a joint review of Duren and Batson 
jurisprudence at the state level, even if there is plenty of discussion about these two approaches 
 
29 R. M. Re, “Re-justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the 
American Criminal Jury.” Yale Law Journal, 116 (2007), 1568-1614. 
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individually; Re discusses Batson to highlight flaws in the demographic conception approach, 
but he does not consider Batson reform. I will devote space to both areas of jury discrimination 
jurisprudence. Many authors advocate certain reforms of the jury system to ameliorate jury 
discrimination, such as eliminating peremptory strikes or increasing juror pay. Most of these 
reforms would start with jurisprudence revisions. I will make my own proposals to reform 
relevant jurisprudence while also considering potential statutory reforms, something less 
commonly seen in discussions of jury discrimination. 
Statement of Purpose 
 Batson’s federal origin distracts from jury discrimination’s chief battleground: the state 
courts. Most defendants are tried in state courts alone; most venirepersons sit on or are 
excluded from state-level juries. Hence jury discrimination most often occurs, and is most often 
battled, without the media and scholarly commentary garnered by federal cases. To assess the 
fight against jury discrimination solely by examining federal cases is to overlook most of “the 
action.” This thesis endeavors to shed light on the states’ lamentably obscure implementations 
and interpretations of Duren and Batson. Five states - Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, 
and Washington - have been chosen for their geographical spread and varied approaches to 
jury discrimination. None of these states has significantly expanded upon Duren, and their 
implementations thereof evince a struggle to hew to the Duren Court’s original intention. Three 
states - Connecticut, Florida, and Washington - have meaningfully expanded upon Batson in 
hopes of more effectively rooting out conscious and unconscious discrimination. Illinois and 
Louisiana have been comparatively unadventurous apropos Batson, though certain decisions of 
theirs merit close reading.  
While I cannot provide a full nationwide picture of Duren and Batson’s respective state-
level statuses, I hope to introduce the reader to a representative selection of the endless 
improvements and perversions alike that these landmark cases have undergone, largely without 
the nationwide attention enjoyed by federal decisions. More importantly still, this thesis makes 
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the case that Duren and Batson direly need substantive reform. Jurisprudential reform of the 
necessary caliber requires the collaboration of federal and state courts. So far, the federal 
courts have neglected their share of this difficult work, leaving the state courts to enforce Duren 
and Batson with minimal guidance. It is not unrealistic to hope that recent state-level reform 
efforts in Washington and Connecticut will compel other state and federal courts to 
collaboratively contemplate new means of eradicating jury discrimination. For this to happen, 
legal minds must recognize and scrutinize state-level Duren and Batson jurisprudence beyond 





















Chapter I: Five State-Level Duren Jurisprudences 
Illinois 
 One would expect the serious constitutional responsibility of drawing a venire from a “fair 
cross-section of the community” to be supervised to prevent biased interference. Unfortunately, 
as the Illinois’ Third District Court of Appeals found in People v. Hollins (2006), jury coordinators 
sometimes have the leeway to manipulate venires as they see fit. During voir dire, the first 
sixteen venirepersons called belonged to a minority group. Thirteen were black. Defendant 
Hollins’ counsel, aware that the great majority of Kankakee County’s residents were white, 
motioned for a new trial on the grounds of racial disparity in the voir dire process. 
 A subsequent investigation revealed that the Kankakee County’s jury coordinator had 
manually changed the status codes of certain minority jurors to create a custom venire panel 
that intentional overrepresented minorities. Though the trial court ruled against Hollins, the 
Court of Appeals considered the manipulation of the venire sufficient to satisfy all three prongs 
of the Duren test even without the aid of demographic statistics to show that whites were 
underrepresented. Importantly, the Hollins court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that defense 
counsel waived the right to raise a Duren objection because he did not object during voir dire. 
Instead, the Hollins court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brookhart v. Janis (1966), in which the 
Court ruled that "there is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a 
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’"30 31  
Though the Hollins court did not address it directly, Hollins reveals a facet of jury 
discrimination rarely remarked upon and largely unaddressed. Unsupervised county employees 
can manipulate venires in relative secrecy. Although this incident is not necessarily 
 
30 People v. Hollins, 366 Ill. App. 3d 533 (2006). 
31 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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representative of jury coordinators broadly, Hollins reminds us that those with responsibilities of 
constitutional magnitude need oversight. As importantly, the Hollins court was wise to cite 
Brookhart. Too often, potentially valid constitutional complaints are halted because of alleged 
waivers and other technicalities. Here, the court acknowledged that defense counsel could not 
have raised an informed objection during voir dire because he was unaware of the jury 
coordinator’s conduct. No matter when counsel raises them, constitutional objections are too 
consequential for perfunctory defeat by technicalities. 
Disconcertingly, the Third District Court has not been consistent in its consideration of 
Duren claims. In People v. Bradley (2004), the Third District Court set a precedent that it seems 
to have forgotten by the time it decided Hollins. Bradley appealed on the grounds that his trial 
counsel failed to object to the near-entirely white venire panel during voir dire. Just one of the 48 
venirepersons was African-American. Trial counsel commented on this disparity, remarking, “[I]n 
22 years of practicing law in these courts I've never seen a group, particularly African 
Americans, as underrepresented as in this case." Yet trial counsel did not advance an objection. 
On appeal, Bradley argued that his counsel was charged with statistically demonstrating that 
blacks were underrepresented; specifically, trial counsel should have shown the disparity 
between a county-wide black population of 28.8% and a venire representation of 3%. This is an 
absolute disparity of about 26%. The Bradley court rejected the defendant’s argument on the 
grounds that he did not prove that a Duren objection would have changed the outcome of the 
case. The court disputed two assumptions allegedly made by the defendant: (1) that the 
statistics, had they been advanced by trial counsel, would have achieved a prima facie case of 
systematic exclusion; and (2) that the composition of the venire could not have occurred by 
chance. The Bradley court understood systematic exclusion as a trend that occurs over the 
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course of multiple venire assemblies, rather than as a defect that might occur in the context of a 
single venire.32 
Bradley and Hollins contemplated the Duren test, and by extension the constitutional 
rights it protects, fundamentally differently. The Hollins court recognized that manipulation of the 
venire might happen in an individual case without seeping into others, without remarking upon 
the jury coordinator’s treatment of other cases. Yet in Bradley, the court opined that to satisfy 
the third Duren prong, “There needs to be some showing of underrepresentation as a pattern, 
with a particular group underrepresented on jury panels over a significant period of time.”33 
These two approaches are at odds. Must defense counsel investigate how other venires have 
been assembled, or is it sufficient to show systematic exclusion in the context of one venire? 
The second approach, that used in Hollins, is preferable, for it allows a more flexible and 
comprehensive view of systematic exclusion. Considering that Hollins followed Bradley, one 
might assume that the Third District Court changed its understanding of systematic 
underrepresentation in the two years separating the cases. But there is no indication that the 
court remembered, much less addressed, Bradley during this time. The Hollins opinion did not 
mention Bradley. This pair of opinions demonstrates not a gradual improvement in fair cross-
section jurisprudence but an arbitrary, case-by-case approach. 
 Inconsistency is not the only troubling feature of Illinois’ Duren jurisprudence. The 
Second District Court of Appeals’ People v. Flores (1990) placed too high a burden on 
defendants who challenge county venire drawing methods. Florez alleged that Hispanics were 
underrepresented by Boone County’s method. Statistics showed a concerning disparity: while 
4.3% of Boone County was Hispanic according to the 1980 census, just 0.004% of 
venirepersons drawn between 1980 and 1987, or five out of 1,360, had Spanish surnames. 
Flores further argued that if Boone County’s method drew venire from a truly fair cross-section 
 




of the community, each venire of 80 would contain about 3.44 Hispanics. Boone County’s venire 
statistics showed a 4.6% likelihood of a twelve-person jury having one Hispanic member, yet on 
a representative jury that figure would be 31%. Underrepresentation stood at 90.7% based on 
the 1980 census. As for the venire drawing method itself, random selection from voter 
registrations, defense concluded that Hispanics may be less likely to vote and Boone County 
could better represent its minorities by selecting names from a driver’s license holder list. The 
State leveled two arguments against the Flores’ case: 1) the expert witness who analyzed the 
list of names was not a genealogist, and hence could not be relied upon to determine each 
surname’s ethnicity; and 2) the census data was too old to be valid. The court accepted both of 
these arguments and ruled that Flores did not satisfy the second Duren prong.34 
 The court’s acceptance of the State’s argument has concerning implications for 
defendants’ burden of proof in Duren cases. First, the alleged necessity of a genealogist to 
determine whether a name is Hispanic conflicts with the distinctiveness of Hispanic names. 
Even if the expert witness had missed some Hispanics - e.g. Hispanic women who marry non-
Hispanics and change their names - the defense’s method would be sufficiently comprehensive 
to show the degree of representation. Assume that the five Hispanic names found are just a 
quarter of the true number of Hispanics called to venires in the relevant period; this would still 
constitute serious underrepresentation. The State, motivated to find as many Hispanic names 
as possible on the list of venirepersons called between 1980 and 1987, still found a grossly 
underrepresentative 14.35 If the number of Hispanics called in this period reflected the Hispanic 
population in Boone County, we would expect to see Hispanics comprise about 4.3% of 1,360 
venirepersons, or 58.48 Hispanic venirepersons. Neither the Flores’ name count nor the State’s 
name count, even if lacking, approaches 58.48 closely enough to assuage concerns about 
underrepresentation. It can further be surmised that Boone County did not keep any racial data 
 




about its venirepersons at all; otherwise, Flores would not have had to count Hispanic 
surnames. Requiring defendants to enlist a genealogist when there is no alternative to counting 
names creates too severe a burden on those seeking enforcement of their constitutional rights.  
Worst of all, the Flores court foreclosed use of 1980 census data because of its seven-
year vintage at the time of the trial, presenting a formidable barrier to advancing a Duren 
challenge. Duren challenges require demographic statistics to argue underrepresentation. If 
census data is ruled out, there may not be any other demographic data available, making the 
underrepresentation prong of the Duren test impossible to prove. Thus does the Flores court 
effectively place an insurmountable burden on Duren defendants without access to up-to-the-
minute demographics. Any decision that effectively prevents the defense of one’s constitutional 
rights has created too high a burden. A more prudent approach would be to permit the most 
recent census data available. Flores remains binding to this day. If today’s Second District Court 
adheres to precedent, a defendant in 2019 may not use the most recent census data from 2010. 
Connecticut 
 Connecticut is unusual for its use of the substantial impact test instead of absolute or 
relative disparity to determine whether a venire drawing procedure violates the fair cross-section 
requirement. In State v. Castonguay, decided by Connecticut’s Supreme Court in 1984, the 
court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of 
each case."36 The disparity tests “are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue 
represents a very small portion of the community,” and the court argues that the substantial 
impact tests allows judges to consider underrepresentation “in terms of its impact on juries” 
rather than as abstract data.37 38 Substantial impact is determined by calculating how many 
additional venirepersons of a certain ethnic group would have to be added to the average venire 
 
36 State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 (1984). 
37 State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578 (2000). 
38 State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 247 (1985). 
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panel to achieve fully accurate representation. Connecticut has not adopted a bright line number 
at which systematic underrepresentation can be said to have occurred. 
 State v. Gibbs (2000) is a typical and instructive use of Connecticut’s substantial impact 
approach. At the trial level, defense counsel argued that Hispanics were underrepresented on 
the venire and that Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 51-217(a)(3) (Rev. to 1995), which excludes from 
jury service anyone who “is not able to speak and understand the English language,” violated 
the defendant’s right to a jury comprised of fair cross-section of the community. The court found 
that “under the substantial impact test, approximately three (2.36) Hispanic persons would have 
to be added to every jury array of 100 persons in order to eliminate any underrepresentation,” 
which “does not represent a substantial underrepresentation.”39 This figure’s substantiality is 
completely subjective. Connecticut should either adopt a bright line number to clearly demarcate 
what is and is not substantial, or find a new way of determining disparity. 
 Jury discrimination has recently received a great deal attention in Connecticut, as the 
state Supreme Court’s recently decided State v. Moore (2019) deals with venireperson diversity. 
Moore argued that Connecticut’s judiciary must collect demographic data about venirepersons 
in order to make Duren challenges possible. The defendant in Illinois’ People v. Flores ran 
against the same brick wall of insufficient demographic data, but did not go so far as to argue 
that the state should be required to make demographic records. Though Moore ultimately lost, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion indicates openness to reconsidering its Duren 
jurisprudence. 
 The Connecticut Appellate Court ruled against Moore in 2016. In regard to the Sixth 
Amendment, Moore argued that (1) the trial court incorrectly rejected his argument that blacks 
were underrepresented on the venire panel during voir dire and that (2) the appellate court 
should "mandate that the jury administrator collect demographic data so that it is able to follow 
 
39 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217(a)(3) (Rev. to 1995). 
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the statutory directive to prevent [discrimination] in jury selection."40 Connecticut’s population is 
about 11% black as of the 2010 census and 6.5% black in New London County, where Moore 
was charged. Of about 120 prospective jurors, three African American females were the only 
blacks present. Moore, an African American man, filed a written objection and requested an 
evidentiary hearing. New London County draws venireperson names from four sources: the 
Department of Revenue Services, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Labor, 
and each town’s voter registration list. Moore called six witnesses to reflect this diversity of 
sources. The Connecticut Judicial Branch’s Jury Administrator, who organizes venires, testified 
that she does not collect racial data because such is not required. None of the directors of the 
four sources of venireperson names collects racial data about those on their lists.41 
 Connecticut General Statutes § 51-232 (c) requires that venireperson questionnaires 
include optional demographic questions including race and ethnicity “to enforce 
nondiscrimination in jury selection.”42 Moore argued that this language constitutes a requirement 
that the state "assure a nondiscriminatory [venire] panel," and urged the Appellate Court to use 
its supervisory powers to enforce his reading of the statute. The State countered Moore’s 
argument by contending that no underrepresentation had been proven, and that even had it 
been proven, Moore had not proven it to be caused by “race-blind” systematic venireperson 
selection methods. The Appellate Court ruled against Moore’s underrepresentation claim 
because his statistics were insufficient: no demographics concerning the entire New London 
County jury pool or of jury-eligible black males were provided.43 
 Although there is merit to Moore’s ultimate conclusion that the court must mandate 
demographic data collection, his statutory argument is fatally misguided. The cited language in 
 
40 Defendant also claimed that the venire panel violated his right to equal protection, but this is unrelated 
to Duren claims and will not be covered here. 
41 State v. Moore, 180 Conn. App. 116 (2018). 
42 Conn. Gen Stat § 51-232 (2012). 
43 State v. Moore. 
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§ 51-232 (c) does not require the state to collect demographic data. A constitutional argument 
would be more persuasive. Assuming, as federal jurisprudence requires, that defendants have a 
Sixth Amendment right to what the Taylor Court described as a jury drawn from a “fair cross-
section of the community,” defendants must be able to make informed challenges to venire 
panels. The informed challenge constitutes a subsidiary right implied by Taylor and by the Sixth 
Amendment itself. In order to make an informed challenge, defendants must have accurate 
demographic statistics concerning venirepersons, counties, and states. Such statistics require 
records of venireperson race, which New London County does not provide. Thus does New 
London County, likely unintentionally, deprive defendants of the opportunity to exercise their 
Sixth Amendment rights.  
The Appellate Court’s own reasoning supports a constitutional argument for the 
requirement of demographic statistics collection: “Constitutional, statutory and procedural 
limitations are generally adequate to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity of the 
judicial system. Our supervisory powers are invoked only in the rare circumstance [in which] 
these traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the 
courts.”44 New London County’s method of selecting venirepersons, and its associated failure to 
collect demographic statistics, prevents defendants from enforcing their Sixth Amendment right 
to a representative jury. Such a grave shortcoming is more than enough to satisfy the Appellate 
Court’s rigorous requirements for invoking supervisory authority.  
Jury administrators may be reluctant to collect racial data because such could invade the 
privacy of venirepersons who wish not to disclose their race. But there is no need to attach a 
racial classification to the name of each venireperson; instead, only the number and proportion 
of each race and gender need be recorded. Members of the judiciary, ever concerned with 
precedent, may correctly point out that statistics collection has been the legislature’s territory 
 
44 State v. Fuller, 158 Conn. App. 378 (2015). 
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since the first census in 1790. Given the dire importance of Sixth Amendment rights, and the 
damage that could be done to the judiciary’s public image if these rights are left unenforceable, 
the courts have not only a right but a responsibility to break with convention and begin collecting 
demographic data. This, rather than a statutory argument, was the most convincing reasoning 
Moore’s counsel could have presented. 
While Moore’s argument could have been more persuasive, the Appellate Court’s 
reasoning suggests indifference to what it calls the “dearth” of available data. The court 
comments that the defendant “did not even purport to provide the court with any evidence with 
respect to the racial and ethnic composition of that jury pool generally.”45 This characterization 
places the blame on the defendant for failing to provide such evidence. Indeed, such data would 
be required if we assume that a fair cross-section includes only those eligible for jury duty. But 
the defendant cannot be reasonably expected to collect demographic data himself. It must come 
from the state, for only the state has access to information about which residents are jury 
eligible. The court, in dismissing the defendant’s limited evidence, foisted the state’s data-
gathering responsibilities onto the defendant.  
 Moore’s climb up the appellate ladder ended when the Connecticut Supreme Court 
denied the appeal, on the ground the court has already authorized a Jury Selection Task Force 
to assess Duren and Batson jurisprudence and propose reform solutions.46 The Task Force’s 
organization is a milestone in the fight against jury discrimination. Connecticut is only the 
second state to consider overhauling Duren and Batson jurisprudence in this manner. We will 
examine this development further in the section below on Connecticut’s Batson jurisprudence.  
Louisiana 
 Louisiana’s approach to jury discrimination incorporates statutory guidelines in addition 
to common law jurisprudence. The state’s Code of Criminal Procedure article 419(A) provides: 
 
45 State v. Moore, Conn. App.  
46 State v. Moore, 334 Conn. 275 (2019). 
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“A general venire, grand jury venire, or petit jury venire shall not be set aside for any reason 
unless fraud has been practiced, some great wrong committed that would work irreparable 
injury to the defendant, or unless persons were systematically excluded from the venires solely 
upon the basis of race.”47 While statutory attention to jury discrimination can be laudable, this 
language actually constrains defendants’ ability to successfully challenge venires by adding 
burdens not required by the Duren test. Whereas the Duren test requires that the defendant 
prove that the group in question is distinctive, that the group is underrepresented on the venire, 
and that the underrepresentation is a result of systematic exclusion, Louisiana further requires 
the defendant to prove fraud, a vaguely worded “great wrong committed,” or exclusion based 
solely on race. The race language restricts defendants’ ability to object to underrepresentation 
of gender or religion in Louisiana. Worse, “great wrong committed” is so arbitrary a criterion that 
it cannot but create confusion and elicit strained interpretations from puzzled judges. Duren 
does permit statutes like article 419(A): “States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications 
for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may be fairly said that the 
jury lists or panels are representative of the community."48 But this language weakens Duren by 
allowing states to limit its jurisprudential power. While article 419(A) does not prove that 
Louisiana’s legislature intended to constrain the Duren process, its language suits such intent. 
Article 419(A)’s application in fair cross-section cases has consisted with the potential for 
constraint outlined above. In State v. Jacobs (2005), Louisiana’s 5th Circuit Court of Appeal 
used this statute’s narrow language to dismiss the defendant’s arguments. Jacobs argued that 
Jefferson Parish, where he was charged, illegally exempted people of certain professions from 
jury duty. Police, medical personnel, and firefighters were among the professionals listed as 
exempt on a document entitled “List of Excusal Codes.”49 (This document’s origin is not clarified 
 
47 LA Code Crim Pro 419.  
48 Duren v. Missouri. 
49 State v. Jacobs, 904 So. 2d 82 (2005). 
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in the opinion.) Duren itself declared gender-based exemptions from jury service 
unconstitutional.50 Assuming that professions can constitute groups, as should be evident from 
the existence of unions, exempting these people should be equally unconstitutional. The Jacobs 
court dismissed Jacobs’ reasoning regarding juror exemptions on the ground that the Clerk of 
Court’s Director of Information Services “was unable to confirm or deny defendant’s assertion 
that those groups are still regularly excluded.”51 This dismissal is questionable given that the 
aforementioned document in question was marked as Defense Exhibit 1 of November 12, 2002. 
Since this postdates the defendant’s indictment on August 15, 2002, the exemptions contained 
in the document were still current at the time of the defendant’s trial, regardless of the Clerk’s 
testimony.52 
Jacobs next argued that Jefferson Parish’s potential juror database overrepresents 
certain people who, for example, changed their names upon marrying, or entered different 
names when registering to vote and obtaining a driver’s license. The court concluded that this 
objection to the parish’s venire drawing methods proved neither exclusion of a distinct group nor 
of a certain race per the terms of article 419(A).53 This line of reasoning, unlike that regarding 
the exemption list, largely accords with Duren’s tenets. Not only does the defendant’s 
overrepresentation argument amount to little more than speculation, it does not identify an 
excluded and distinct group. The court’s invocation of article 419(A), however, departs from 
Duren jurisprudence in its dependence on race as a criterion for systematic 
underrepresentation.  
Jacobs concluded by arguing that Louisiana’s exclusion of convicted felons from grand 
jury service under Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure article 401 constitutes exclusion, and 
 
50  Duren v. Missouri. 
51 State v. Jacobs.  
52The court does not clarify whether the November 12, 2002 date reflects the date at which this document 




is unconstitutional under Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that “full 
rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following 
conviction for any offense.” The court rejected this argument on the grounds that full rights of 
citizenship consist only of “basic rights such as the right to vote, work or hold public office;” 
additionally, Article V of the Louisiana Constitution provides that the legislature may qualify juror 
eligibility once a citizen reaches the age of majority.54  
The court’s reasoning defies the meaning of “full rights of citizenship.” “Full” implies 
“complete” and “whole” without qualification or caveat. Jury service, as a constitutionally 
protected component of citizenship, unequivocally falls under the “full rights” umbrella. There is 
no statutory or constitutional basis for the court’s conception of jury service as less essential to 
citizenship than voting or holding public office. Hence the Jacobs court’s reasoning devalued 
jury service and, with it, the judiciary, the very institution within which its members made a 
career. As for Jacobs’ argument, article 401 does appear to unconstitutionally withhold full 
citizenship rights from the distinct group comprised of convicted felons. 
In assessing the Jacobs decision holistically, it bears notice that the court largely refrains 
from applying the Duren test despite mentioning the test and its steps at the outset of the 
analysis. Only the professional exemption argument receives scrutiny under the Duren test 
while the court rejects the defendant’s other arguments on different grounds. This approach 
suggests either unfamiliarity with or indifference to the federally prescribed approach to 
determining whether a fair cross-section violation has occurred. Moreover, the court’s two 
citations of article 419 (A) do nothing to advance the analysis, for, as discussed above, this 
statute does not accord with Duren. 
Judges are but one source of jurisprudential misapplication and misinterpretation in 





number of blacks on the venire - 12 out of 25 - and the number on the jury, one out of six. 
Defense counsel argued that this amounted to a fair cross-section violation and cited Batson v. 
Kentucky.55 Duren, of course, provides the relevant jurisprudence and test for any inquiry 
regarding a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation, whereas Batson concerns Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection. Defense counsel’s mistake suggests that many attorneys are ill-
prepared to raise fair cross-section claims. Indeed, many of the defense attorneys involved in 
the cases cited in this piece fail to request statistics or adequately explain why they believe 
systematic exclusion has occurred. In State v. Brooks (2002), for example, defense counsel did 
not attempt to offer evidence for the second and third steps of the Duren test in the face of an 
all-white jury.56  
Brooks’ approach is no more effective than failing to raise an objection at all. 
Demographic statistics for the defendant’s parish, Jefferson, or an overview of Jefferson’s 
venire drawing process would have allowed the defendant’s fair cross-section claim a chance at 
success, especially given the damning all-white jury. Brooks’ failure here may be attributed to 
inexperience with the Duren process, lack of initiative, or both. Such conduct has grave 
consequences when constitutional rights are implicated as they are when a fair cross-section 
violation occurs. While judges’ reasoning on fair cross-section claims is often troubling, 
Matthews and Brooks exemplify the all-too-common lack of experience attorneys have 
challenging jury discrimination. 
Louisiana has also dealt with the perennial question of whether states must provide 
attorneys with the demographic statistics essential to their Duren claims, as in State v. 
Lamondre Markes Tucker (2015). Tucker, appealing his conviction for conspiracy to commit jury 
tampering in his first-degree murder trial, noted a disparity between Caddo Parish’s 47% black 
 
55 State v. Matthews, 859 So. 2d 863 (2003). 
56 State v. Brooks, 807 So. 2d 1090 (2002). 
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population and his venire’s 30% black composition. He blamed the use of voter registration rolls 
to draw venirepersons, and claimed that the trial court “erred in the denial of his subpoena for 
the jury venire records of Caddo Parish for the years 2006-2011 because it prevented him from 
asserting claims based upon an extensive set of data.” The state countered that “the request for 
all jury venire records for the years 2006-2011 was untimely, oppressive, and a heavy burden 
on the Caddo Parish Clerk of Court;” pointed to Louisiana’s digitized, “100% random” 
venireperson drawing system; and alleged that the defendant failed to make a prima facie case 
of “systematic exclusion of any distinct population from his jury venire.” The Circuit Court 
concluded that because Tucker filed his subpoena 30 days before trial, the trial court has 
insufficient time to comply, making the “request for six years worth of complete jury venire 
data... arguably burdensome and oppressive [emphasis added].”57 
 As discussed in the Connecticut and Illinois sections above, withholding demographic 
information about venirepersons amounts to blocking defendants from securing their Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the instant county’s population. 
Federal jurisprudence thus justifies the content of Tucker’s subpoena. But the subpoena’s 
timing, not its content, is at question here. The opinion omitted an estimate of how long 
compliance with the subpoena might have taken, instead referencing State v. Graham (1982), 
which upheld a trial court’s subpoena quash because to comply would have entailed fitting three 
months of work into one week.58 The court assumed without concrete factual basis that a similar 
burden would have befallen the trial court had they complied with Tucker’s subpoena. Such 
cursory examination of the subpoena’s timing failed to ascertain whether Tucker placed an 
undue burden on the trial court.  
 
57 State v. Tucker, 170 So. 3d 394 (2015). 
58 State v. Graham, 422 So. 2d 123 (1982). 
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Mentioning the two years Tucker had to file his subpoena accomplished nothing without 
further scrutiny of the relevant timeline, for Tucker was justified in waiting if 30 days was enough 
time for the trial court to comply with his subpoena. Ironically, Tucker’s own burden likely 
exceeded the trial court’s regardless of when he filed the subpoena. As discussed above, 
Duren’s state-level implementations often burden claimants with proving underrepresentation, a 
near-insurmountable evidentiary hurdle without access to demographic statistics about 
venirepersons. The state and court’s use of the words “untimely,” “oppressive,” and 
“burdensome” in reference to the trial court’s burden distracts from and obscures the great 
burden placed on Tucker to secure his Sixth Amendment rights. There is no mention here and 
little mention in any opinion of the outsized burden placed on Duren claimants, an alarming lack 
of recognition of the evidentiary brick wall that meets Duren claimants. Constitutional rights-
based claims need special insulation from restrictive technicalities. American courts must treat 
defendants’ constitutional claims not as bureaucratic inconvenience but as sacrosanct exercise 
of individual agency in the face of dauntingly powerful state machinery. 
Florida 
 Like Louisiana, Florida has a statutory framework in addition to its fair cross-section 
jurisprudence. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.290 (1973) provides that: 
The state or defendant may challenge the panel. A challenge to the panel may be made only on 
the ground that the prospective jurors were not selected or drawn according to law. Challenges to the panel 
shall be made and decided before any individual juror is examined, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
A challenge to the panel shall be in writing and shall specify the facts constituting the ground of the 
challenge. Challenges to the panel shall be tried by the court. Upon the trial of a challenge to the panel the 
witnesses may be examined on oath by the court and may be so examined by either party. If the challenge 
to the panel is sustained, the court shall discharge the panel. If the challenge is not sustained, the individual 
jurors shall be called. 
 
 Florida’s statute does not constrain the process to the same degree as Louisiana’s; 
nonetheless, by requiring defendants to comply with this statute in addition to federal and state 
jurisprudence, the legislature may have decreased the likelihood that a defendant will raise and 
succeed on a fair cross-section claim. Cargill v. State (2013) exemplifies this possibility. 
Defense counsel made the following objection: “Your Honor, I do have to make one procedural 
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objection just is that the panel, and I recognize that a lot of this has to deal with demographics, 
but the panel lacked any African-Americans this morning. So I just for that purpose would just 
like to lodge that objection just in case Mr. Cargill at some point in time needs to address that on 
appeal.” The appeals court ruled that because defense counsel made this statement after the 
petit jury had been selected, and made the objection verbally rather than in writing, the 
conditions of rule 3.290 went unmet and the objection was invalid. Hence, the appeals court 
deemed the trial court to have acted properly.59 Had it not been for the technicalities created by 
rule 3.290, defense counsel might have been allowed to pursue a Duren objection more 
completely.  
Though the legislature put Cargill at a disadvantage in regard to raising a fair cross-
section claim, his counsel cannot be exempted from knowing the law and working within its 
parameters. A more extreme example of incomplete knowledge about fair cross-section law is 
found in Gordon v. State (2003). Gordon alleged that the trial court “erred in summarily denying 
his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not effectively challenging the all-white venire from 
which his jury was selected.” The court rejected Gordon’s claim on the grounds that Gordon did 
not make a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of blacks on appeal; indeed, he did not 
explain what defense counsel should have done differently at the trial level.60  
Gordon contains two instances of inadequately argued Duren challenges: first, Gordon’s 
defense counsel at the trial level; second, appellant Gordon. Ironically, in alleging that his trial 
counsel failed to support the Duren challenge, appellant Gordon failed to support his own 
ineffective counsel claim with evidence of systematic underrepresentation of a distinct group. 
Gordon did not learn, in other words, from his trial counsel’s mistakes. The court’s only choice 
was to reject this poorly supported reasoning. Gordon is a testament to the frequent inefficacy of 
 
59 Cargill v. State, 121 So. 3d 1157 (2013). 
60 Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215 (2003). 
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Duren claims. On the rare occasion that a defendant makes such a claim, it is often given less 
than the maximum amount of support because defense counsel is unfamiliar with the case law. 
Granted, demographic information can be difficult to come by, as Illinois and Connecticut’s 
Duren case history makes clear; even so, defendants should have the requisite knowledge 
about fair cross-section jurisprudence to put together more compelling arguments than seen 
here. If they cannot access the necessary information, defendants should underline this very 
constraint as part of their complaints. 
As a multi-ethnic state, Florida sees frequent debates about what a representative venire 
should look like. While conventional views about representation have rarely gone beyond 
gender and skin color, what about those who are non-English speakers? Woodel v. State (2008) 
dealt with two challenges for cause against venirepersons who would have required Spanish-
speaking interpreters in order to serve on a jury. Woodel “[recognized] that there was case law 
which prevented the court from permitting an interpreter to enter the jury room for deliberations 
but [argued] that this case violated the Constitution” by excluding non-English speakers in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. The court rejected this reasoning on the grounds that 
“Hispanics who are not proficient in English” are not necessarily a distinctive group. Moreover, 
section 40.013(6), Florida Statutes (2005) provides for exemptions "upon a showing of hardship, 
extreme inconvenience, or public necessity." In this case, the court considered it “public 
necessity” that an interpreter not be present during jury deliberations to preserve the validity of 
the process.61 62 
The Woodel court’s explanation of whether non-English speaking Hispanics are a 
distinctive group is too vague and perfunctory to be authoritative. Hispanics more broadly are 
uncontroversially distinctive on account of their racial identity; but should subsets of distinctive 
 
61 FL Stat § 40.013 (2005). This statute was revised in 2016.  




groups be considered distinctive in and of themselves? Or, could non-English speaking 
Hispanics be considered part of a broader spectrum of non-English speaking Americans? 
Non-English speakers may share characteristics less commonly found among English-
fluent Americans of immigrant descent: first-hand familiarity with the difficulties of immigration, 
experience with the discrimination and general hardship associated with adapting to an English-
dominated society, and cultural values closer to those of their parent culture than to those of the 
United States. These characteristics, if found to be present in non-English speakers, could mark 
them as distinctive regardless of ethnicity; those with citizenship would thus have a theoretical 
right to jury service. Alternatively, many courts would decline to consider aspects of distinct 
group membership independent of ethnicity or gender, and would group non-English speaking 
Hispanics with Hispanics broadly rather than with non-English speakers broadly. These 
problems illustrate a deeper truth about the Duren process: groupings tend to be arbitrary. An 
individual might be part of dozens of groups at once; which of these are significant enough to 
require at least theoretical representation on venire panels?  
Achieving consensus on this last question borders on impossibility. Richard Re’s 
enfranchisement conception of the fair cross-section requirement could provide a solution. Re 
recognized the problem of overlapping group membership, and proposed that representation be 
determined by whether every eligible juror, regardless of group membership, has the 
opportunity to be included in the venire. If anyone were systematically denied this opportunity, 
the venire would be unrepresentative. No inquiry into group membership, much less the 
distinctiveness thereof, would be necessary. In regard to Woodel, the enfranchisement 
conception would focus not on the group membership of non-English speaking Hispanics but 
upon their opportunity to serve as jurors. As citizens, they would have a right to “jury 
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enfranchisement,” and any venire from which they are systematically excluded would be 
unrepresentative.63 
The Woodel court’s concerns about the presence of an interpreter during jury 
deliberations have merit. Interpreters could sway or influence the juror for whom they interpret, 
or they could make other jurors uneasy. Florida’s case law, especially Dilorenzo v. State (1998), 
supports this reasoning.64 However, if interpreters take an oath not to unduly influence their 
assigned jurors, concerns about impartiality could abate; after all, the judiciary administers oaths 
to jurors and witnesses to ensure their impartiality. To sum, the question of whether to allow 
non-English speakers to serve on juries creates unique problems. Their eligibility depends on 
whether they are a distinct group, whether the judiciary adopts an enfranchisement approach, 
and whether interpreters would cause a disturbance during deliberations. 
Another uncertain area of Duren jurisprudence is whether whole ideologies can properly 
be excluded from jury service. Faced with this question, the Florida Supreme Court’s Hodges v. 
State (2003) explored whether Duren should be extended to ideological subsets of a county 
population. After all, a jury cannot be truly representative if its jurors are drawn from an 
ideologically homogenous venire, for there exists no ideologically homogenous county. At trial, 
defense counsel claimed that " [the State] is striking every one [sic] who has reservations about 
the death penalty,” and that “I think it's going to invalidate our defendant's right to a fair cross-
section of the community." Defense counsel appeared to conceive of those who oppose the 
death penalty as a discrete group within the community. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that 
the State’s striking for cause of most if not all venirepersons who had reservations about the 
death penalty did not constitute a fair cross-section violation. The opinion did not consider 
whether ideological cohorts are in fact groups meriting representation on venire panels.65  
 
63 Re (2007). 
64 DiLorenzo v. State, 711 So. 2d 1362 (1998). 
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37 
Like non-English speakers, ideological cohorts fall outside the traditionally recognized 
categories of “group” outlined in fair cross-section jurisprudence. Generally, only race and 
gender receive protection. But ideological cohorts can be just as distinctive as these two more 
widely recognized classifications, and moreover, “distinctive” remains a vague and indefinite 
way to classify groups. What makes African Americans, for example, more distinctive than 
people who oppose the death penalty? Why is the former more deserving of accurate 
representation on a venire panel? If a community has a significant anti-death penalty population, 
surely it would be unrepresentative to exclude all of these people from jury service. Ideology is a 
group trait like race or gender, only without the same external visibility. An enfranchisement 
conception of jury service would limit the State’s ability to exclude jurors of a certain ideology by 
requiring that all eligible jurors have an opportunity to be called for any given case.  
Concerns about bias are a plausible retort to the prospect that certain ideologies should 
be represented on venire panels. After all, an anti-death penalty juror might be unlikely to vote 
to impose the death penalty even before having heard the case facts. But this amounts less to 
an unfair, kneejerk prejudice against the State than to a personal conviction. Many such 
convictions, whether they are for or against the State, are reasonable. Moreover, bias is 
impossible to eliminate, for there is no “ideological default.” Everyone involved in the judicial 
process has some sort of bias. The role of voir dire is not to prevent representation of certain 
anti-State or anti-defendant ideologies but to weed out genuinely unfair prejudices, such as 
those that might come from knowing the defendant’s family personally or believing that 
government is inherently evil. A venire panel containing venirepersons who are against the 
death penalty will yield more ideologically diverse juries; ideologically diverse juries will have 
more engaging, spirited discussions, with throughly considered verdicts. Promoting ideological 
representation, then, could actually reduce juror bias. Opponents of this approach will point out 
the impossibility of representing every ideology, but all that is necessary is that every individual 




 Does banning felons from jury service constitute systematic underrepresentation of 
blacks? Felon exclusion appeared in the aforementioned Louisiana case, State v. Jacobs 
(2007), but Washington’s State v. Christian (2013) differs in the defendant’s argument that felon 
exclusion equates to black exclusion. As the court summarizes: 
[Christian] argues that the cumulative effect of the disqualification provision and the racial bias in 
the production of felony convictions in King County is “to allow a deductive conclusion that, assuming all 
else in the operation of [Washington General Rule 18] is random and race-neutral … the group 
summonsed to jury duty under that rule must under-represent people of color and black citizens in 
particular.” 
 
The State argued that blacks and felons are not interchangeable groups, and that only 
the former is excluded by law, so no unconstitutional underrepresentation had occurred. The 
court agreed and added that felons “cannot constitute a distinctive group in the community” 
because the exclusion of felons had been deemed constitutional in previous decisions.66 But 
there is strong demographic evidence that felon exclusion has a disproportionate impact on 
blacks. As Uggen, Manza and Thompson (2006) found, felons and ex-felons comprise “22.3 
percent of the black adult population, and an astounding 33.4 percent of the black adult male 
population.”67 Felon exclusion from jury service, then, could exclude one in five black adults and 
one in three black male adults. Proponents of felon exclusion will respond that any black 
exclusion is unintentional and a justifiable punishment for committing a felony. Such a response 
underrates the value of black participation in the judiciary. Endorsement of felon exclusion also 
underestimates the degree to which jury service is necessary for individuals to feel involved in 
and valued by society. The court’s pious invocation of previous rulings upholding felon exclusion 
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rules without reevaluating the issue is disingenuous, for courts can change jurisprudence when 
they conclude it treats litigants unfairly. This is a foundational tenet of American common law. 
Felons are not the only group excluded from Washington’s judiciary. Juror salaries are 
low enough to dissuade poor venirepersons from responding to summonses. In In re Pers. 
Restraint of Yates (2013), Yates argued that Washington’s $10 per day juror salary “excludes 
working class and nonelderly persons.” Yates included demographics concerning the 
percentage of Pierce County venirepersons in the 18-65 and 65-plus age brackets. He did not 
include similar demographics about the working class or about “the percentage of members of 
the venire within each of these [two] categories.” The Washington Supreme Court seized on 
these evidentiary deficiencies as reason to dismiss his argument.68  
Indeed, Yates’ demographics do not satisfy the second Duren step, so the dismissal was 
justified. Nonetheless, his argument might have been persuasive had he provided a more 
complete demographic picture.69 While jury service is as much a duty as a right, the judiciary 
cannot reasonably expect working class Americans to forego their daily wages without 
appropriate compensation. Washington’s juror salary is too paltry to sustain low-income families 
during their breadwinners’ work absences. It is only natural for struggling members of the 
working class to ignore summonses for the sake of their difficult livelihoods. Employers cannot 
be relied upon to compensate their employees during jury duty absences. Eades (2001) found 
that Texas’ “no-shows,” those who did not respond to summonses, “were three times more likely 
than the Shows to receive no wages at all [during jury duty had they served].”70 Given the 
frequency of underrepresentation on venire panels, the no-show phenomenon is likely not 
unique to Texas. Yates suggests that jury service is equally disincentivized in Washington State. 
Thorough jury deliberation depends on representation, which in turn depends on low financial 
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risk for all eligible jurors. The solution is, for once, clear: either require jury duty compensation 
by employers or pay jurors an appropriate hourly wage. 
Tracking disincentivization between people of different socioeconomic backgrounds is 
difficult without demographic records. Like Connecticut in State v. Moore (2016), Washington’s 
judiciary has grappled with whether the state must record venireperson demographics so that 
defendants can include such in fair cross-section arguments. In State v. Cienfuegos (2001), the 
defendant argued (a) that because “12.38 percent of Skagit County residents are [non-white], 
jury venires should reflect this same statistical balance;” (b) that “it was error not to provide the 
names and addresses of the 700 people on the jury panel list;” and (c) that “[General Rule 18 
(GR 18)] is unconstitutional because it does not identify jurors by race, which would allow 
defendants to quickly determine if the jury panel represents a fair cross section of the 
community.” GR 18 (b) reads in relevant part: 
(b)  Jury source list.  "Jury source list" means the list of all registered voters of a county, merged 
with a list of licensed drivers and identicard holders who reside in that county. The list shall specify each 
person's first and last name, middle initial, date of birth, gender, mailing address, and residence address. 
 
The court rejected Cienfuegos’ argument on the grounds that he did not provide 
evidence regarding the second and third Duren steps, and that his inability to make a proper 
Duren argument due to unavailable and withheld information was moot because “a bare 
allegation that the jury list is not representative is sufficient to bring this issue into play.”71 
Cienfuegos was able to make only a “bare allegation” because the county failed to 
provide him with the information required for a prima facie Duren claim; yet, by the court’s logic, 
the county was not required to give him information because he made only a “bare allegation.” 
This is circular reasoning. Rather than mooting his argument, the unavoidable “bareness” of 
Cienfuegos’ case should signal that Washington State deprives defendants of the tools they 
need to secure their Sixth Amendment rights. To argue that the county need not provide these 
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tools when there is no other recourse is effectively to argue that the county need not protect 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the population. 
Consider that the opinion cited above was issued by the Washington Supreme Court. That an 
institution of such repute would employ circular reasoning to deny a defendant’s right to an 
informed Duren claim demonstrates the flippancy modern American courts accord jury 
discrimination. Given that defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights concern the judiciary, the 
judiciary should take chief responsibility for enforcing these rights; hence the judiciary must 
secure each defendant’s right to challenge their venire panel.  
Cienfuegos, by making a constitutional argument, avoids to some degree the mistake 
made by Connecticut’s defendant Moore; yet as GR 18 does not prohibit collection of juror 
demographics to aid Duren claimants, he ultimately cripples his argument by deeming GR 18 
unconstitutional. Cienfuegos would be best served not by arguing that the Constitution 
invalidates GR 18, but that the Constitution demands collection of juror demographics to 
supplement GR 18’s requirements. 
 Within any statute that concerns venire drawing, no matter how well-meaning, lies the 
potential for unforeseen exclusion. The Supreme Court of Washington contemplated Rev. Code 
Wash. (ARCW) § 2.36.055’s effect on juror exclusion in State v. Lanciloti (2009). This statute 
provides: “In a county with more than one superior court facility and a separate case assignment 
area for each court facility, the jury source list may be divided into jury assignment areas that 
consist of registered voters and licensed drivers and identicard holders residing in each jury 
assignment area.”72 Washington’s legislature passed this statute in response to concerns by 
King County, which charged Lanciloti, that its venire drawing procedure discriminated against 
“poor and minority jurors.” Formerly, venirepersons “were summoned to either courthouse 
randomly, without regard to proximity,” forcing upon some venirepersons the inconvenience of 
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traveling to the farther courthouse. According to data gathered in collaboration between the 
Seattle-King County Department of Public Health and an area judge, “lower income and racial 
minority citizens were less likely than higher income and non-minority citizens to report to a 
court house more distant from their home.” The statute corrected this shortcoming by allowing 
King County to divide itself into two jury districts. Venirepersons would report to whichever 
courthouse was in their district, theoretically reducing average transit time and cost.73 King 
County was almost certainly well-intentioned. On its face, the statute should have increased 
minority representation by easing travel to each of the two King County courthouses. Such a 
proactive approach to meeting Duren’s fair cross-section mandate might seem an unlikely 
candidate for a Duren challenge. 
 Yet Lanciloti argued that § 2.36.055 split one county into two unrepresentative halves in 
violation of the Washington Constitution’s guarantee “an impartial jury of the county in which the 
offense is charged to have been committed [emphasis added].” The case’s outcome depended 
on whether “of the county” entailed the entire county or any portion thereof. The court 
referenced its own precedents, such as State v. Twyman (2001), which opined that equating “of 
the county” with “of the entire county” was “unpersuasive on its face.” In State v. Newcomb 
(1910), the court ruled constitutional a statute that “divided up each county into multiple districts 
and required that each jury panel be drawn from more than one district,” for “the words ‘jury of 
the county,’ as used in our constitution, have never been held to mean more than that the jurors, 
when summoned, should come from some part of the county.” County redistricting “can be 
safely and properly left to legislative enactment,” ruled the Newcomb court. Shortly after, the 
court found in State ex rel. Lytle v. Superior Court (1913) that “the plain intent of the words ‘jury 
of the county’ is that the defendant is entitled to have the venire extended to the body of the 
county, and that it may not be restricted to a less unit; at least, without express legislative 
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sanction.” Lanciloti’s argument rested on what came before the semicolon, the court’s dismissal 
thereof resting on what came after. Finally, the court found that Lanciloti had not proven that 
demographic differences between the two new jury districts “amount to a systemic exclusion of 
a distinctive group.”74 
 Lanciloti’s concerns about underrepresentation were not baseless. Bifurcating King 
County necessarily affected representation, as two halves of a county cannot be ideologically 
and demographically identical. If, inadvertently or otherwise, bifurcation left one district 
significantly poorer or more racially diverse than the other, poor or minority defendants charged 
in the richer and less diverse district might face less sympathetic jurors. Worse, bifurcating or 
otherwise dividing a county raises the specter of gerrymandering. The legislature could 
arbitrarily allocate county population subsets to courthouses in order to diffuse minority 
influence or maximize representation of, say, pro-death penalty venirepersons. On the other 
hand, the same power of allocation could increase fair representation by placing defendants 
before jurors drawn from their immediate community. For example, a Hispanic defendant might 
be tried by more Hispanic jurors if the venire is drawn from a smaller district containing the 
defendant’s Hispanic neighborhood than if the venire is drawn from a larger county. Sub-county 
districts could thus try defendants more representatively than counties if divided fairly. This latter 
scenario falls in line with the Washington Supreme Court’s proffered explanation of how § 
2.36.055 was developed. King County’s own argument for § 2.36.055, that poor venirepersons 
had trouble getting to the farther courthouse, is persuasive in light of difficulties to venirepersons 
as revealed in Yates. Lanciloti’s argument that § 2.36.055 backfired, while facially plausible, 
could not succeed without the definite evidence of underrepresentation lacking from his 
argument.75 The court was justified in rejecting his argument on these grounds. 
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 While decisions concerning Duren claims often feature hasty and arbitrary reasoning, 
Lanciloti found the Washington Supreme Court vindicating a constructive reform to drawing 
venires. Though § 2.36.055 and statutes like it must be used with restraint, and courts must be 
wary of ulterior motives on legislatures’ parts, large counties with multiple courthouses would do 
























Chapter II: Two Non-Reformed State-Level Batson Jurisprudences 
Illinois 
 Over thirty years of Batson jurisprudence have yielded no national consensus on what 
constitutes a step one prima facie case of discrimination. At step one, strike opponents are to 
use “facts and any other relevant circumstances [to] raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”76 
But “relevant circumstance” has proven too nebulous to define conclusively, even after Miller-El 
v. Dretke (2005) propounded certain circumstances that trial courts may properly consider. 
What seems relevant to one trial court might seem trivial to another. Less clear still, how does a 
trial judge objectively determine whether the strike opponent has “raised an inference?”  
The Illinois Supreme Court sought to resolve these uncertainties in People v. Williams 
(1996). Williams raised a Batson challenge when the State struck Harold Martin, an African 
American venireperson. The trial judge and parties appear to have disregarded the intended 
order of the three step Batson inquiry, defense counsel asking the State for his step two race 
neutral reasons before articulating a step one prima facie case. The State informed the court of 
this sequential error, yet proceeded with a race-neutral reason: “You saw he was a black man 
with red hair. You heard the answers to his questions, that he was not satisfied [with the 
outcome of an unrelated criminal case to which he had been privy]. I don't think we have to at 
this time come forward with any reasons why… this man was excluded.” Defense counsel 
countered that the State had accepted John Sterba, a white venireperson, despite Sterba’s 
similar dissatisfaction with the resolution of a unrelated criminal case. But “[t]he State informed 
the trial judge that, at that point in the proceeding, the trial judge only had to determine whether 
a prima facie case had been established and did not need to compare Martin with Sterba.”77 
The trial judge compliantly directed defense counsel to focus on Martin for the purposes of step 
 
76 Batson v. Kentucky. 
77 People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996). 
 
46 
one, and, finding no prima facie case, did not formally proceed to step two. Williams appealed 
the trial court’s finding. The Illinois Supreme Court, ruling that Williams failed to put forth a prima 
facie case of discrimination at step one, laid out the following relevant circumstances for use by 
future courts: 
(1) racial identity between the defendant and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes 
against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against 
African-American venirepersons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as 
compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and 
while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were 
a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the 
defendant, victim, and witnesses. A trial judge's determination of whether a prima facie case has been 
shown will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.78 
 
 The Williams court considered which of these circumstances was applicable. Only the 
Williams court’s assessment of factor (6) is troubling. Williams asked the court to consider that 
despite Sterba, white, and Martin, black, giving similar voir dire answers, only Martin was struck. 
The court refused to resolve this issue because factor (6) requires only comparison between 
venirepersons of the same race:  
Although we have considered the nonracial characteristics common to stricken African-American 
venirepersons and non-African-American jurors in assessing heterogeneity, we find that this 
consideration is not mandatory in every case. See [People v. Henderson, (1990)] (it is not the role of the 
court to search for possible similarities between stricken black and accepted white venirepersons).79  
 
The relevance of Sterba and Martin’s similarities is beyond question. If these men were 
alike in all but their race, yet only the African American was struck, an inference of racial 
discrimination would be all but irrefutable. Dismissing an obviously relevant circumstance 
because it is not “mandatory” is irresponsible. Just decision of Batson cases at the trial and 
appellate levels depends on consideration of all relevant circumstances. The Williams court 
continued in this vein by misguidedly approving the trial judge’s direction to Williams that he 






and Sterba’s similarities were relevant and thus fair game for inclusion by Williams in his step 
one presentation. Williams’ Batson inquiry, with its sequential errors and exclusion of relevant 
details, proceeded improperly, and was thus ripe for remand. That the Illinois Supreme Court 
condoned these errors bodes poorly for Illinois’ minority venirepersons. 
Williams cannot surprise in light of the federal judiciary’s failure to define what 
constitutes a “relevant circumstance” and an “inference of discrimination.” In so failing, the 
Batson Court left lower courts to answer highly subjective questions prone to arbitrary answers. 
Illinois’ list of seven relevant factors, though unsatisfying in its Williams application, is a 
reasonably comprehensive effort at solving these open-ended puzzles. Certain additions would 
hone the list. Factor (5) might further consider the types and length of questions addressed to 
minority venirepersons; if, for example, a prosecutor asks a minority venireperson five questions 
about her profession, yet asks an otherwise similar venireperson zero such questions, strike 
opponents and judges should consider this plainly relevant circumstance. Missing altogether 
from Illinois’ list of factors is a given venireperson’s statement of whether they can approach the 
instant case impartially. The peremptory strike of a minority venireperson who unequivocally 
states her willingness and ability to be impartial should be met with healthy skepticism, for such 
a strike would have no obvious justification. Venireperson statements of (im)partiality are 
therefore properly included in the strike opponent’s case at step one. 
“Relevant circumstance” raises another difficult question: how many suspicious 
circumstances must exist for a judge to find a prima facie case of discrimination? One highly 
suspicious circumstance might persuade a judge that an inference of discrimination has been 
reached, while five more trifling suspicious circumstances might cumulatively have the same 
effect. Most strike opponents assert some middling number of moderately suspicious 
circumstances. Williams presented two circumstances, basing his step one argument on the 
State’s divergent treatment of Martin and Sterba and on the prosecutor’s comment that Martin 
was a “black man with red hair.” The Williams court took issue with neither of these 
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circumstances but did find that “factors suggesting purposeful discrimination include the racial 
identity between defendant and the excluded venireperson and the interracial nature of the 
crime.” So it was that two circumstances suggesting prima facie discrimination did not tip the 
scales. While this reasoning is not wrong per se, the Williams court did not explain whether it 
was the supposed insignificance of these two factors or their small number that foreclosed a 
prima facie finding. A federal bright-line rule for use at step one of the Batson inquiry could 
decide once and for all how many suspicious circumstances compel a prima facie finding, 
dispelling the sort of ad hoc reasoning employed in Williams and, no doubt, in other state courts. 
Exceptions could be made to such a bright-line rule for small numbers of suspicious 
circumstances judges nonetheless consider especially troubling. If a bright-line rule strikes the 
federal judiciary as micro-management, more precise definitions of “relevant circumstance” and 
“inference of discrimination” would be a worthy alternative. 
 Another area of Batson jurisprudence left unexplored by the federal judiciary is the sua 
sponte motion. The U.S. Supreme Court originally conceived the Batson challenge for use by 
defendants against prosecutors: “A defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory 
challenges at the defendant's trial.”80 Georgia v. McCollum (1992) granted prosecutors, too, the 
ability to raise Batson challenges.81 Yet there exist no federal guidelines for trial judges to raise 
a sua sponte Batson challenge. The Illinois Supreme Court devised its own such guidelines in 
People v. Rivera (2007) after a trial judge took it upon himself to challenge a defense attorney’s 
peremptory strike.  
At trial, defense counsel peremptorily struck venirewoman Deloris Gomez after her voir 
dire testimony. The trial judge requested that defense and State counsel join him in chambers 
for discussion. Without putting forth the prima facie case of discrimination required by step one, 
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or indeed giving any basis for his Batson challenge, the trial judge asked defense counsel to 
“kindly articulate a basis of why you are excusing Ms. Gomez." This request amounted to step 
two of a Batson inquiry. Defense counsel protested the sua sponte motion. The trial judge 
explained, “It is the citizen's right to sit as a juror, and I will implicate myself sua sponte if I feel 
somebody's right are being impinged upon." Defense counsel’s step two race-neutral reason 
consisted of Gomez’s employment at a hospital, where she was exposed to gunshot victims like 
those involved in the instant murder case. The trial judge remarked during defense counsel’s 
step two testimony that “Mrs. Deloris Gomez appears to be an African-American,” then asked to 
"hear from" the prosecutor, who had hitherto been present for but uninvolved in the Batson 
inquiry. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel had put forth an insufficient basis for his 
strike. The trial judge concluded the inquiry: “I feel under these circumstances the reasons given 
by you, Mr. Decker, do not satisfy this Court. As far as I'm concerned, it's more than a prima 
facie case of discrimination against Mrs. Gomez. I'm not going to allow her to be excused. She 
will be seated as a juror over objection.”82 
Defense counsel’s further questioning of Gomez did not sway the court, as her hospital 
career took place in a “business office” setting where, presumably, she would have had limited 
contact with gunshot victims. The Illinois Supreme Court issued two Rivera opinions; in the first, 
the court found that "the articulated reason for a challenge is a matter of 'concern' only after a 
prima facie case has been established,” mooting the trial judge’s step two inquiry. Guidelines for 
a sua sponte Batson challenge in Illinois were as follows: 
In sum, we hold that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte, but it may do so only when 
a prima facie case of discrimination is abundantly clear. Moreover, the trial court must make an adequate 
record consisting of all relevant facts, factual findings, and articulated bases for both its finding of a prima 
facie case and for its ultimate determination at the third stage of the Batson procedure.83 
 
 




The court remanded for a hearing at which the trial judge could articulate his prima facie 
case for discrimination, as follows: 
The jury was composed of a majority of women; I believe after a review of the transcripts, nine 
women and three men. One African-American female was accepted as a juror. Another whose race was 
in fact unknown was excused as well. Couldn't tell by her name what race she belonged to. No one had 
any personal recollection. One female was excused. She had been African-American as well. Defendant 
sought to excuse another female African-American, a Mrs. Gomez, peremptorily. She was the third 
female juror challenged by the Defendant.84  
 
In its second Rivera opinion, the court concluded that the trial judge had based his prima 
facie case on gender, but that neither the number of female venirepersons struck nor the 
questions asked of Gomez in fact amounted to a legitimate prima facie case of discrimination. 
This did not require reversal, for the U.S. Supreme Court’s harmless error test enunciated in 
Neder v. United States (1999) - "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" - was answered in the negative.85 86 
 The Rivera court’s solution to the sua sponte issue evinces a deep commitment to the 
peremptory strike. Not even Illinois’ trial judges may restrict this right without an “abundantly 
clear” prima facie case.87 88 Requiring judges to participate in the sua sponte Batson inquiry as 
an interested party as opposed to an (ideally) objective observer muddles the already 
complicated Batson framework. Batson challenges were designed for resolution through 
adversarial argument between two attorneys. A judge who finds a prima facie case of 
discrimination and consequently raises a Batson challenge is less likely to hear the strike 
proponent’s step two race-neutral reason with the same objectivity as if that same judge were 




86 Neder v. United States, 527 US 1, (1999). 
87 People v. Rivera. 
88 A wording found nowhere in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
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against the peremptory strike from the inquiry’s outset, jeopardizing its legitimacy. Indeed, the 
trial judge in Rivera hardly entertained defense counsel’s step two race-neutral reason. 
Moreover, the Rivera court did not clarify the would-be strike opponent’s89 proper role in 
the sua sponte Batson inquiry: was the trial judge correct to ask the prosecutor’s advice after 
step two, or should the prosecutor have abstained from the inquiry altogether? Any solution to 
opposing counsel’s role in a sua sponte Batson inquiry is unsatisfying, for no counsel should be 
excluded from proceedings, yet a sua sponte challenge does not involve the would-be strike 
opponent at its outset. The Rivera court’s guidelines thus confuse as much as they resolve. A 
cleaner solution would allow trial judges to disallow peremptory strikes as they see fit. Such 
would avert confusing inquiries with foregone conclusions. Questions about the would-be strike 
opponent’s role would become moot. Inevitably, allowing trial judges the discretion to disallow 
peremptory strikes would stoke fears about the erosion of a sacred procedural right. But 
hesitant jurisdictions could limit judges to a certain number of disallowances, leaving the rest to 
the parties, who are more motivated to raise Batson challenges in the first place. 
 Rivera testifies to the federal judiciary’s patchy Batson jurisprudence. Even if many state 
judges have the wisdom requisite for crafting procedures as complex as sua sponte Batson 
inquiries, Rivera notwithstanding, leaving so many Batson particulars to the states has resulted 
in uneven and confusing precedents. The Batson Court’s deferral of implementation to the 
states was fully intentional: “In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state 
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our 
holding today.”90 Though Chief Justice Burger’s dissent shortsightedly clung to the Swain-era 
peremptory challenge, his admonition that the Court “leaves roughly 7,000 general jurisdiction 
state trial judges and approximately 500 federal trial judges at large to find their way through the 
 
89 In this case, the prosecutor. 
90 Batson v. Kentucky. 
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[Batson] morass” rings true.91 This dilemma should lead the federal judiciary not to renege on 
Batson’s aims, as Burger wished, but to fill gaps in precedent such as the sua sponte issue. 
Granting state courts interpretive autonomy is sensible only insofar as they are spared the 
confusion of filling federal gaps. 
Louisiana 
 Louisiana’s legislature codified an attenuated version of Batson, Louisiana Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CCRP) 795, in 1986: 
No peremptory challenge made by the state or the defendant shall be based solely upon the race 
or gender of the juror. If an objection is made that the state or defense has excluded a juror solely on the 
basis of race or gender, and a prima facie case supporting that objection is made by the objecting party, 
the court may demand a satisfactory race or gender neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge, unless 
the court is satisfied that such reason is apparent from the voir dire examination of the juror [italics added].92 
 
Inclusion of the word “solely” could be read to permit partial discrimination; of the words 
“may” and “unless,” omission of Batson’s step two; and of the words “race or gender,” 
discrimination on the basis of venireperson traits other than these two. CCRP 795 concluded by 
mandating that “the court shall allow to stand each peremptory challenge for which a 
satisfactory racially neutral or gender neutral reason is given,” which can be read as defying 
federal jurisprudence by blocking trial judges from rejecting race-neutral explanations as 
pretextual. 
In August 2019, Louisiana House Representative Mary DuBuisson (R - District 90)’s HB 
477 received the Governor’s signature, amending CCRP 795 as follows:  
No peremptory challenge made by the state or the defendant shall be motivated in substantial part 
on the basis of the race or gender of the juror. If an objection is made that a challenge was motivated in 
substantial part on the basis of race or gender, and a prima facie case supporting that objection is made by 
the objecting party, the court shall demand a satisfactory race or gender neutral reason for the exercise of 
the challenge. Such demand and disclosure shall be made outside of the hearing of any juror or prospective 
juror. The court shall then determine whether the challenge was motivated in substantial part on the basis 
of race or gender [italics added].93  
 
 
91 Id., Burger, CJ., dissenting. 




Replacing “solely” with “in substantial part” targets partial discrimination, and replacing 
“may” and “unless” with “shall” compels fulfilment of steps two and three. Louisiana’s revision is 
laudable, especially considering CCRP 795’s former regressive phrasing. That a Republican 
introduced this measure is especially encouraging in light of the “tough on crime” stance 
common among conservative politicians. Viewed parallel to Washington and Connecticut’s 
recent reforms, HB 477 supports a cautiously optimistic reading of America’s current attitude 
towards jury discrimination reform. Even so, HB 477 does not solve CCRP 795’s preclusion of 
pretextuality findings; this persisting flaw serves as a reminder that current reform efforts, 
though heartening, are but emergent. Crucially, HB 477 catches Louisiana up with Batson 
instead of expanding on existing law. 
 None of HB 477’s proactivity is evident in Louisiana’s jurisprudence. A key example is 
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s State v. Youngblood (2019), notable both for the 
number of African Americans struck by the State during voir dire - nine - and for the Circuit 
Court’s ruling on those peremptorily struck black venirepersons who shared key characteristics 
with accepted white venirepersons. Before considering the case’s particulars, a discussion of 
racial strike ratio - the ratio of minority to white venirepersons struck during voir dire - is in order. 
In Youngblood, nine blacks and one white were struck for a racial strike ratio of 9:1.94 95 Often, 
even obscene racial strike ratios will pass muster if the strike proponent’s race-neutral 
explanations are remotely plausible. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Justice Thomas, commenting 
on a strike ratio of approximately 41:896 over the course of four trials in Flowers v. Mississippi 
(2019), typified a common attitude towards racial strike ratios: “The bare numbers are 
meaningless outside the context of the reasons for the strikes [first emphasis added].”97 Thomas 
 
94 State v. Youngblood, 274 So. 3d 716 (2019). 
95 On appeal, Youngblood only challenged the strikes of five of the nine. The instant discussion considers 
all nine. 
96 The Supreme Court’s opinion leaves unclear whether the State struck any whites at Flowers’ second 
trial, so this ratio is approximate. 
97 Flowers v. Mississippi, Thomas J., dissenting. 
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and his ideological cohorts forget that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. That 
a 9:1 or 41:8 racial strike ratio is race-neutral constitutes an extraordinary claim, and hence 
requires an extraordinarily compelling step two explanation. Judges should scrutinize step two 
explanations in proportion to strike ratios. 
The State’s step two explanations in Youngblood did not begin to account for the 
number of minority venirepersons struck. Venireman Bourgeois, in particular, was excused on 
flimsy grounds. Having already struck three African Americans, the State struck Bourgeois 
because “he had a negative experience with law enforcement, was previously arrested for 
narcotics with intent to distribute, and had an ongoing building construction project which would 
prevent him from staying focused.” In response, “Defendant argues for the first time on appeal 
that two white male jurors also expressed that they either had a prior bad experience with law 
enforcement or had been previously arrested for a crime, yet were not stricken by the State.”98 
This is called a comparative analysis argument. The Youngblood court acknowledged that, as 
ruled in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Miller-El v. Dretke (2005), “More powerful than the bare 
statistics are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and 
white ones who were not. If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies 
just as well to a white panelist allowed to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination.”99 Yet the Youngblood court declined to apply this principle: “The mere fact that a 
prosecutor excuses one person with a particular characteristic and not another similarly situated 
person does not in itself show that the prosecutor's explanation was a mere pretext for 
discrimination.” This statement served to exempt the court from following Miller-El. Alarmingly, 
such a self-granted exemption seems to authorize divergence from federal jurisprudence. The 
court continued: “The accepted juror may have exhibited traits which the prosecutor could have 
reasonably believed would make him desirable as a juror.” Therein we find a presumption of 
 
98 State v. Youngblood. 
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non-discrimination accorded to the strike proponent. But with nine African Americans struck, 
that presumption is tenuous. Youngblood made several other Batson challenges similar to that 
made on Bourgeois’ behalf, consistently arguing that the struck venirepersons shared key 
characteristics with accepted whites. The Youngblood court concluded its analysis of each by 
finding that Youngblood “waived this [comparative analysis] argument by failing to challenge the 
prosecutor's explanations on this ground at the trial court level.”100 
Appellate courts generally dismiss arguments raised for the first time on appeal under 
the “general rule.”101 As the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Singleton v. Wulff (1976), “It is the 
general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed 
upon below.”102 The general rule exists because, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals put it in 
Poliquin v. Garden Way (1993), “If lawyers could pursue on appeal issues not properly raised 
below, there would be little incentive to get it right the first time and no end of retrials.”103 
Appellate judges may, however, except new arguments from the general rule should they find a 
compelling reason to do so: “Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends 
of justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which 
courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions 
which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy.” 
Hormel v. Helvering, U.S. Supreme Court, (1941).104 Universal application of the general rule, 
then, can hinder the pursuit of justice in certain contexts. In United States v. LaGuardia (1990), 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained as follows its decision to consider an argument not 
raised at trial: “Because appellants' challenge to the statutory scheme and the guidelines raises 
an issue of constitutional magnitude which, if meritorious, could substantially affect these, and 
 
100 State v. Youngblood. 
101 Not to be confused with Washington State’s General Rule 37. 
102 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
103 Poliquin v. Garden Way, 989 F.2d 527 (1993). 
104 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941). 
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future, defendants, we believe we should address their arguments despite the fact that they 
were not made below [emphasis added].”105 The Connecticut Supreme Court put forth in State 
v. Golding (1989) a list of criteria which, when satisfied, allow (but do not compel) appellate 
judges to hear new issues: “(1) The record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) 
the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the 
alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; 
and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness 
of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of 
these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail.”106 107 State and federal jurisprudence thus 
provides clear, albeit discretionary, justification for considering newly constitutional arguments 
on appeal.  
A bright-line exemption from the general rule would be appropriate for what the 
LaGuardia court called “[issues] of constitutional magnitude,” for as designated interpreter of the 
Constitution, the judiciary has no higher purpose than to guard the rights enshrined therein. Now 
recall the Youngblood court’s ruling on Youngblood’s newly raised comparative analysis 
argument. Given the constitutional right of venirepersons against discriminatory peremptory 
strikes, and that of the defendant to a trial drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, 
Youngblood’s argument that the State struck African American venirepersons despite their 
similarity to accepted white venirepersons was an archetypal candidate for appellate 
consideration. In rejecting this argument, the Youngblood court cited Delvalle v. Herbert (2004): 
 
105 United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010 (1990). 
106 State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989). 
107 Hypothetical application of Connecticut’s Golding criteria to Youngblood’s comparative analysis 
argument is informative. Youngblood’s argument certainly met prongs (2) and (4), and, assuming the 
relevant voir dire transcripts were preserved, met prong (1). Whether Youngblood’s argument met prong 
(4) is less obvious. A court might see the struck African Americans as so similar to the accepted whites 
that a constitutional violation would be plain. Alternatively, a narrow Batson application - the default in 
most jurisdictions - would lead a court to focus instead on the differences between struck blacks and 
accepted whites, however trivial.  
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“To withhold in the trial court a fact-specific argument in support of a Batson challenge carries 
with it all of the unfairness of holding challenges until ‘trial has concluded unsatisfactorily.’"108 
But the risk of Youngblood’s constitutional rights having been violated outweighed that of his 
counsel exploiting the appeals process. Youngblood’s new argument would have risked neither 
unfairness to the State, for the State had already put forth its race-neutral reasons and 
associated argument; nor abuse of the Fifth Circuit Court, for analyzing the new issue could 
hardly have overwhelmed the justices. Moreover, application of the general rule does not 
necessitate dismissal of Youngblood’s argument. Youngblood raised a Batson challenge at the 
trial level; his argument concerning the similarity of white accepted venirepersons could be 
considered a subsidiary component of that original challenge rather than an entirely new issue. 
Youngblood’s lesson applies at a systemic level: Batson claims are too constitutionally 
significant for defeat by the general rule.109 Technicalities must not smother constitutional rights.  
Louisiana’s recent fortification of its Batson codification is at odds with its 
underdeveloped Batson jurisprudence. Instead of expanding on Batson, the Louisiana judiciary 
tends to apply Batson so narrowly that strike opponents’ already slim chances of success shrink 
to pinhead dimensions. Trial and appellate courts alike stress strike proponents’ technical 
compliance with Batson’s race-neutrality mandate whenever wronged defendants pursue 
Batson inquiries and appeals. But technical compliance with a constitutional mandate is 






108 Delvalle v. Herbert, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14156. 
 
109 This is not an argument for the general rule’s abolition. I go no further here than the general rule’s 
applicability to Batson challenges. 
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Chapter III: Three Reformed State-Level Batson Jurisprudences 
Florida 
 Florida was one of the few states to meaningfully address jury discrimination before the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued Batson. The Florida Supreme Court’s first word on the matter, in 
State v. Neil (1984), responded to defendant Neil’s complaint that the State had discriminatorily 
struck three of four black venirepersons during voir dire in violation of Neil’s Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by an impartial jury. The trial court, apparently indifferent to the prospect of 
discrimination, had held that the Stated needed not explain its strikes and that no inquiry was 
necessary. On appeal, the District Court applied Swain and found no violation thereof, but 
certified Neil to the Florida Supreme Court nonetheless as “this issue is troublesome and 
capable of repetition.” The Supreme Court, drawing from opinions issued in California, 
Massachusetts, and New York - hitherto only this handful had rejected Swain’s ineffective 
framework - devised a three-step Neil test by which trial courts might weed out discriminatory 
peremptory strikes. The Neil test resembles the Batson test, as the latter borrowed ideas from 
state court opinions, but with important differences: 
A party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely 
objection and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group 
and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race [emphasis 
added]. If a party accomplishes this, then the trial court must decide if there is a substantial likelihood that 
the peremptory challenges are being exercised solely on the basis of race [emphasis added]. If the court 
finds no such likelihood, no inquiry may be made of the person exercising the questioned peremptories. On 
the other hand, if the court decides that such a likelihood has been shown to exist, the burden shifts to the 
complained-about party to show that the questioned challenges were not exercised solely because of the 
prospective jurors' race.110 
 
Where Neil demanded a “strong likelihood” of discrimination from the strike opponent, 
Batson demanded a prima facie case of discrimination and an “inference” thereof. The Batson 
step one, while cripplingly vague and subjective in its own right, improved on Neil’s yet more 
burdensome equivalent. Difficult as it to persuade a trial judge of a prima facie case, only the 
 
110 State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481. 
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most brazen, uncamouflaged attempt at discrimination has any chance of being deemed a 
“strong likelihood” by the typical Neil- and Batson-averse trial court. Neil’s step two likewise 
differed slightly but importantly from Batson’s: 
If the [strike proponent] shows that the challenges were based on the particular case on trial, the 
parties or witnesses, or characteristics of the challenged persons other than race, then the inquiry should 
end and jury selection should continue. On the other hand, if the [strike proponent] has actually been 
challenging prospective jurors solely on the basis of race, then the court should dismiss that jury pool and 
start voir dire over with a new pool. 
 
Neil asked for more than the Batson “race-neutral reason” at step two, specifying 
acceptable bases for strikes. Specificity allows for easier interpretation in future cases, giving 
Neil an edge over Batson at step two. Trial courts could compare proffered step two bases with 
those articulated in the passage above instead of struggling to define “race-neutral.” Neil’s 
attempt at specificity, then, is laudable in a body of jurisprudence so mired in vague terminology. 
Florida’s State v. Slappy (1988) further required a “‘clear and reasonably specific’ [step two] 
explanation of [the strike proponent’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising [a strike]” in 
accordance with Batson’s language.111 112 
 The Florida Supreme Court’s Melbourne v. State (1996) modified Neil by lowering the 
burden of proof placed on the strike opponent at step one. Instead of a “strong likelihood” of 
racial discrimination, Melbourne’s step one required only that the strike opponent “a) make a 
timely objection on [racial grounds], b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct 
racial group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike.” This 
simplification handily dispensed with the difficulty inherent to determining “strong likelihoods” 
and prima facie cases. Trial courts can perform voir dire discrimination inquiries more effectively 
with a simple step one like Melbourne’s. Notably, by foregoing a steep burden of proof, 
Melbourne’s step one differed more significantly from Batson’s than did Neil’s. Florida’s abolition 
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of a step-one prima facie or “strong likelihood” requirement at step one distinguishes from nearly 
every other state, hence its placement in this chapter of “reformed” Batson jurisprudences.  
Melbourne’s step two, by contrast, was more in line with Batson’s than was Neil’s, for it 
required a mere “race-neutral” explanation instead of Neil’s specifics.113 Such diminished 
specificity is a counterproductive evolution. More troubling was the Melbourne court’s overt 
embrace of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Purkett v. Elem step two, which “does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.”114 Purkett, as discussed in the Batson history 
overview in Chapter One, left the Batson inquiry even more toothless than its original 1986 form. 
Any step two strike explanation now sufficed to elude Batson, no matter how irrelevant to the 
case or how obvious its fabrication, allowing discriminators conscious and unconscious alike to 
operate unchecked. The Melbourne court could just as easily have required a case-relevant 
explanation; such would have accorded with the original Batson opinion and with Slappy, after 
all. Given the Melbourne court’s willingness to differ its step one from the U.S. Supreme Court’s, 
a parallel willingness to differ step two seems natural, yet did not materialize. Ultimately, the 
Melbourne court brought Purkett’s inanity to Florida’s judiciary, and overruled Slappy to boot. 
Melbourne also revised Neil’s step two burden distribution to reflect Purkett’s. In Batson 
and Neil, the “burden of persuading” the trial court fell on the strike opponent at steps one and 
three, and the strike proponent at step two.115 In Purkett and Melbourne, “the burden of 
persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial discrimination.”116 
117 This shift reflects the persistent fear that Batson inquiries impinge on counsel’s right to 
peremptorily strike any venireperson; and that, unless saddled with the entire burden of 
 
113 Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (1996). 
114 Purkett v. Elem. 
115 State v. Neil. 
116 Melbourne v. State. 
117 The strike proponent does bear the “burden of producing” a race-neutral reason at step two, a much 
easier burden to satisfy than that of persuasion. 
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persuasion or proof, strike opponents will trample the rights of proponents by obstructively 
quashing valid peremptory strikes. 
This fear and Purkett’s ill-conceived solution thereto are rooted in fallacious 
assumptions. First, unless otherwise stipulated by state constitutions like Connecticut’s, 
peremptory strikes are not inalienable. The Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection 
regardless of race, and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section, 
however, are inalienable and as such should receive more robust protection than the 
peremptory strike. Second, a strike proponent’s step two explanation should be more 
compelling than anything advanced by her opponent if she has truly acted without discriminatory 
intent, and correspondingly she should embrace the burden of persuasion as an opportunity to 
convince the court of her position; in other words, the burden of persuasion is not onerous to an 
honest strike proponent. Ideally, dishonest proponents (that is, would-be discriminators) could 
not overcome the burden of persuasion; but the peremptory strike’s concerned guardians may 
rest assured that even dishonest proponents can invent permissible, case-relevant explanations 
to overcome the burden of persuasion with ease. Placing the burden of persuasion on strike 
proponents at step two, then, is not fatal to the peremptory strike, and even if it were, such 
burden distribution is so essential to outing discriminators that valid strike inquiries must 
implement it. Melbourne thus debased Neil’s serviceable step two. 
 The Florida Supreme Court further edited its step two in Dorsey v. State (2003), a mix of 
clarifying and obfuscating revisions quite characteristic of Batson’s progeny. During Dorsey’s 
voir dire, the State struck an African American venireperson, Ms. George, who “appeared 
disinterested throughout. I was looking at her. She was sort of staring at the wall.” Dorsey, 
raising a Batson challenge, claimed to the contrary that Ms. George “was very attentive, smiled 
in a lighthearted manner,” and “when [defense counsel] asked who was happy to be here on 
jury duty, [Ms. George] was the only person [to] affirmatively respond she was happy.” The trial 
court took the State “at her word” and denied Dorsey’s Batson challenge. On appeal in Florida’s 
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Third District, Dorsey argued that "a peremptory challenge based on body language would be 
unacceptable unless observed by the trial judge and confirmed by the judge on the record."118  
The Third District Court rejected this reasoning on the grounds that Melbourne required 
only a “genuine” and not necessarily a “reasonable” explanation for the challenged strike at step 
two. Therein lay the question of whether a contended explanation unsupported by the record 
could count as genuine. On final appeal, the Florida Supreme Court answered that question the 
negative: “[T]he proponent of a strike based on nonverbal behavior may satisfy its burden of 
production of a race-neutral reason during the second step of the process described in 
Melbourne only if the behavior is observed by the trial court or otherwise has record support.”119 
This neatly resolved Dorsey’s central conundrum. A step two explanation concerning nonverbal 
behavior can hardly be deemed genuine without evidence to confirm it. While the Dorsey court 
did not reach so far, it might also have deemed unsupported explanations presumptively invalid.  
Immediately following the resolution of the record issue came this dictum: “Once this 
burden of production is satisfied, the proponent is entitled to the presumption that the reason is 
genuine [emphasis added].”120 The Dorsey court’s phrasing here allows more than one 
interpretation. Does “entitled” mean that if the record supports a step two explanation 
concerning nonverbal behavior, trial courts must uphold the challenged strike? Or can a finding 
of pretext overcome the proponent’s entitlement? Neil held that “the initial presumption is that 
peremptories are exercised in a constitutionally proper manner [emphasis added],” meaning not 
that the trial court would accept any step two explanation supported by the record, but that at 
the outset of a Neil inquiry, a presumption of non-discrimination in the strike proponent’s favor 
placed the initial burden of persuasion on the strike opponent. Trial judges could weigh this 
presumption against the strike opponent’s “strong likelihood” case at step one to determine 
 
118 Dorsey v. State, 806 So. 2d 559 (2002). 




whether the inquiry would proceed to step two. But Neil did not indicate that this presumption 
need extend beyond “the initial.”121 (With Neil’s “strong likelihood” requirement mooted by 
Melbourne, even this initial presumption now has indefinite significance.) The only certainty in 
Dorsey’s entitlement language is expansion of the Neil presumption beyond the inquiry’s outset 
when record-supported nonverbal behavior is at issue. 
One of Neil, Melbourne and Batson’s key enforcement mechanisms was the trial judge’s 
ability to deny a strike as pretextual even when its proponent’s explanation was record-
supported and race-neutral. This reflected an awareness that competent strike proponents 
could craft record-supported, race-neutral pretexts to disguise discrimination. An likely 
pretextual explanation, no matter how well supported by the record, deserves no presumption of 
genuineness. Precedent held that trial judges were in the best position to determine whether a 
given step two explanation was pretextual. Whether the Dorsey court intended to preserve the 
trial judge’s discretion to deny record-supported pretexts is unclear.  
The Dorsey dissent postulated a very different problem: that the majority actually curbed 
the presumption of genuineness accorded to the strike proponent by requiring record-support of 
the step two explanation. The “broad presumption of nondiscriminatory intent in Melbourne,” the 
dissent argued, would have permitted the strike challenged by Dorsey without need for 
affirmation by the record.122 (This is not what the majority meant; see the last three paragraphs.) 
These concerns are remarkable not for their accuracy but as an example of the extent to which 
guardians of the peremptory strike wish to hobble Batson jurisprudence. Strike proponents’ 
exemptions from any burden of persuasion and from advancing a reasonable explanation at 
step two, which together make the strike opponent’s job nearly impossible even when a 
challenged strike is obviously discriminatory, were not enough for the dissent, which sought for 
strike proponents this additional exemption from having to support step two explanations with 
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record-derived evidence. Those who fear the peremptory strike’s extinction are unwilling to 
tolerate even the slightest increase of Batson’s - or in this case, Melbourne’s - power. 
Certain Florida District Court opinions have considered Dorsey’s ambiguities. In the 
Fourth District’s Harriell v. State (2010), the court dealt with a Melbourne inquiry in which the 
State argued at step two that venireman Sanders had been sleeping; i.e., an undesirable 
nonverbal behavior. Harriell’s counsel said she “didn't see him sleeping at all,” with which the 
trial judge concurred. Harriell’s counsel added, “Whether he's sleeping or not, if he had his eyes 
closed, it doesn't matter. He can still be listening. He could be resting his eyes." The Harriell 
court deemed the exchange unlike Dorsey in that defense counsel “did not expressly dispute 
the prosecutor's observations about juror Sanders.”123 In fact, Harriell’s counsel’s assertion that 
she had not seen Sanders sleeping was just such a dispute; the court’s decision otherwise was 
a distortion of the transcript. The Harriell court concluded that the State satisfied its record-
supported burden of production and was thus entitled to a presumption of genuineness per 
Dorsey. This conclusion suggests a reading of Dorsey’s presumption-entitlement language in 
which the trial court must decide for the State upon advancement of a record-supported, race-
neutral explanation. Such a reading jeopardize trial judge discretion to deny a strike on the basis 
of prextuality when “inattentive venirepersons” are at issue. 
The Fifth District’s Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallo (2018) allowed the trial 
judge more discretion in the face of presumption-entitlement. At trial, Travelers struck an African 
American woman and explained in response to Gallo’s Melbourne challenge that she had been 
“inattentive and did not appear engaged in the jury selection process.” The trial judge disallowed 
the strike on the basis that Travelers’ step two explanation was “legally insufficient;” but as the 
Fifth District later ruled, such explanations concerning nonverbal behavior can in fact be legally 
sufficient per Dorsey. After the inquiry’s conclusion, “Gallo's counsel placed on the record that 
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his observations of this juror ‘were completely opposite of [Travelers'] counsel.’” The trial judge 
“commented that the [venireperson] was ‘not particularly different’ from other ‘introverted’ 
venirepersons that it sees on a regular basis, but it specifically agreed with Travelers' counsel's 
observation that this juror was ‘not particularly engaged.’” The Fifth District seized on this 
statement as confirming Travelers’ observations as genuine and record-supported, entitling 
Travelers to a presumption of genuineness. While the Fifth District reversed on the basis of the 
trial court’s erroneous conclusion of legal insufficiency, its opinion also substantively discussed 
presumption-entitlement: “[T]he presumption that Travelers' peremptory challenge was genuine 
could have been rebutted by other relevant factors such as ‘the racial makeup of the venire; 
prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based on a reason equally 
applicable to an unchallenged venireperson; or singling out the venireperson for special 
treatment.’"124 
Travelers thus resolved the Dorsey ambiguity about trial judge discretion in the trial 
judge’s favor (even as it reversed this specific trial judge’s decision). Trial judges may, per 
Travelers, deny a strike on the basis of pretextuality even if the strike proponent’s step two 
explanation concerns record-supported nonverbal behavior.  It is unclear whether the Dorsey 
court intended this interpretation, which the Harriell court appears not to have shared. Trial 
judges cannot determine pretext objectively when the presumption-entitlement is binding. 
Therefore, with a mind to blocking pretextual step two explanations, Travelers’ interpretation is 
preferable to Harriell’s. Ideally, the Dorsey court would not have created this ambiguity in the 
first place. Given Slappy’s holding that “a judge cannot merely accept the reasons proffered at 
face value, but must evaluate those reasons as he or she would weigh any disputed fact,” the 
case for the strike proponent’s entitlement to a presumption of genuineness at step three given 
a record-supported explanation concerning nonverbal behavior is tenuous.125 Exemption from 
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any burden of persuasion - an immoderate advantage - sufficiently protects strike proponents 
from spurious Melbourne inquiries, to the extent that any presumption of genuineness is 
unnecessary. Dorsey’s presumption-entitlement language, then, ambiguous and overly 
accommodating of strike proponents, only sets back the decades-old Neil progeny. Florida’s 
lower courts should follow the Travelers court’s interpretive lead. 
Another recent lower court decision, the Second District Court’s Spencer v. State (2016), 
considered the trial judge’s discretion to rule on a step two explanation’s genuineness not in 
Dorsey’s light but in that of the Florida Supreme Court’s Hayes v. State (2012). The Hayes court 
ruled that a Melbourne inquiry had proceeded improperly because “the trial court erroneously 
relieved the State—the opponent of the strike—of its burden to establish that the reason for the 
challenge, despite being gender-neutral, was pretextual.” In other words, the trial court had 
relieved the strike opponent of its burden of persuasion. The Hayes court maintained that as 
stipulated in Melbourne, “if the explanation is facially race-, ethnicity-, or gender-neutral, the 
court must determine whether the explanation is a pretext ‘given all the circumstances 
surrounding the strike,’ with the focus of this inquiry being the genuineness of the 
explanation.”126 Hence a determination of pretext is not optional but mandatory. These Hayes 
holdings, which go no further than restating existing precedent, were baselessly interpreted in 
Spencer to mean that a trial judge need not consider genuineness at step three unless the strike 
opponent specifically claims the strike proponent’s step two explanation was pretextual. The 
Spencer court on determining pretext: 
It simply is not the job of the trial court to develop the circumstances that may weigh against the 
genuineness of a proposed peremptory challenge. The trial court has an obligation to maintain its neutrality. 
See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983) ("Every litigant, including the State in 
criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge," and a court has the 
duty "to scrupulously guard this right." (quoting State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 1385, 131 So. 
331 (1930))); J.L.D. v. State, 4 So. 3d 24 … If the trial court is to maintain its position of neutrality, its job is 
merely to rule on this delicate and fact-intensive issue when the opponent has presented the issue for ruling 
under its burden of persuasion. 
 
 
126 Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452 (2012). 
 
67 
Moreover: “[I]t is the better practice for a trial court to affirmatively ask an opponent to 
state all of the circumstances the opponent believes support a claim of pretext, but if the trial 
court omits this step, it should be incumbent upon the opponent to object and ask to place into 
the record the circumstances that it wishes the trial court to consider and the appellate court to 
review.”127 By this reasoning, trial judges may skip the genuineness consideration if the strike 
opponent does not mention pretext specifically. The strike opponent’s already excessive burden 
thus swells even further. Moreover, a trial judge who independently concludes that a step two 
explanation is pretextual may not disallow a strike per Spencer if the strike opponent does not 
explicitly indicate agreement. Erosion of the trial judge’s discretion to disallow peremptory 
strikes, nascent in Dorsey and Harriell, is full-fledged in Spencer. This holding directly 
contradicts Melbourne’s aforequoted requirement that a genuineness inquiry occur. Indeed, a 
Melbourne inquiry cannot be said to have concluded until a genuineness inquiry occurs. 
Spencer thus licenses trial courts to undertake incomplete Melbourne inquiries. The importance 
of considering an explanation’s genuineness needs little qualification; strike proponents can and 
do lie at step two. Trial judges need in their procedural arsenal the ability to ferret out dishonesty 
and rule accordingly with or without prodding from the strike opponent. 
As for the Spencer court’s concerns regarding trial judge neutrality, considering 
genuineness without being asked to do so hardly constitutes bias. After all, if, as Florida 
Supreme Court precedent requires, the presumption of non-discrimination cushions the strike 
proponent and the entire burden of persuasion falls on the strike opponent, the entire Melbourne 
process gives the proponent enough advantage to stamp out any hypothetical bias towards the 
opponent. A genuineness inquiry unsolicited by the strike opponent does not require the trial 
judge to “develop the circumstances that may weigh against the genuineness of a proposed 
peremptory challenge [emphasis added];” instead, the trial judge need only reflect on the voir 
 
127 Spencer v. State, 196 So. 3d 400 (2016). 
 
68 
dire proceedings she has just witnessed. No imagination is required. Moreover, as countless 
opinions testify, trial judges seldom rule against strike proponents in their genuineness inquiries 
(or whatever a given jurisdiction’s equivalent might be). There is little danger of biased trial 
judges haphazardly using the genuineness inquiry to deny valid peremptory strikes, and hence 
no need to curtail trial judges’ authority to consider genuineness as they see fit. 
Importantly, the trial judge could just as well have too much discretion in the Melbourne 
or Batson process. Trial judges must not, for example, skip inquiry steps or permit step two 
explanations that they know are not race-neutral. But equally, jurisprudence must not restrict 
trial judges from acting when they suspect that discrimination has occurred. Appellate courts 
must not disallow findings of pretext when some arbitrary criterion, such as a lack of explicit 
remark by the strike opponent, is unmet. Rulings to the contrary allow discrimination to fly under 
the radar. 
Florida has relied more on its own, state-level jurisprudence than most states in 
addressing jury discrimination. Its numerous rulings thereon, from courts high and low, attest to 
a proactive engagement with this issue. As discussed, Neil and Melbourne offer certain 
advantages over Batson, especially at Florida’s simplified step one. Certain jurisprudential 
shortcomings, however, cannot be overlooked. If the Florida judiciary wishes for steps two and 
three of the Melbourne inquiry to proceed efficiently and effectively at the trial level - and, 
indeed, if it wishes to avoid a glut of confusing appellate rulings on these steps - it must clarify 
when and how the strike opponent’s burden of persuasion can overcome the strike proponent’s 
presumption of non-discrimination. Better yet, eliminate the presumption altogether, for the 
burden of persuasion is daunting enough that Melbourne inquiries are generally foreclosed in 
the proponent’s favor regardless. Though Florida has taken action, its lesson echoes that of 
Illinois: the U.S. Supreme Court has irresponsibly dropped its knotty three-step framework, 
further confused by Purkett, onto bewildered state courts in hopes that they will solve the 
problem on their own. The continuing nonappearance of a true solution midway through 
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Batson’s third decade of life heralds the need for state and federal courts to collaborate on an 
overhaul. 
Washington 
 So profoundly has Washington changed the Batson process that the very Batson 
moniker rings inapplicable to Washington’s revised jurisprudence. A chain of proactive Batson 
decisions ultimately led the Washington Supreme Court to drastically lower the burden of proof 
on the strike opponent at step one. This trajectory began with State v. Rhone (2005), in which a 
prosecutor struck the only black venireperson during voir dire. Rhone argued that striking the 
only member of a certain minority constituted a prima facie case of discrimination. Disagreeing, 
the trial court did not move the Batson inquiry beyond step one. Rhone’s subsequent climb up 
the appellate ladder attracted attention from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The 
ACLU proposed a bright-line rule in which striking the sole member of a cognizable group would 
constitute an automatic prima facie case of discrimination, arguing that the rule would “(1) 
ensure an adequate record for appellate review, (2) account for the realities of the demographic 
composition of Washington venires, and (3) effectuate the Washington Constitution's elevated 
protection of the right to a fair jury trial.” The Washington Supreme Court’s 2010 5-4 Rhone 
opinion concluded that “Adopting a bright-line rule would negate [step one] of the [Batson 
inquiry] and require a prosecutor to provide an explanation every time a member of a racially 
cognizable group is peremptorily challenged. Such a rule is beyond the intended scope of 
Batson, transforming a shield against discrimination into a sword cutting against the purpose of 
a peremptory challenge.”128 Cautious deference to Batson and to the peremptory strike itself 
mark this line of thought. 
 Rhone’s dissent endorsed the bright-line rule. Diverging from the majority’s stance that a 
bright-line rule lay outside Batson’s scope, the dissent argued, “So long as the State's purpose 
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in excluding the venire member is nondiscriminatory, it will be permitted to exercise its challenge 
and the purpose of the peremptory challenge will not be undermined.”129 In other words, a 
bright-line rule would not unfairly encroach on the rights of honest strike proponents. Chief 
Justice Madsen’s concurrence contained the caveat that “going forward, I agree with the rule 
advocated by the dissent.”130 With five justices in favor of the bright-line rule, its implementation 
was only a matter of time. The matter resurfaced in State v. Saintcalle (2013), in which the 
Washington Supreme Court noted: 
Unconscious stereotyping upends the Batson framework. Batson is equipped to root out only 
“purposeful” discrimination, which many trial courts probably understand to mean conscious discrimination. 
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. But discrimination in this day and age is frequently unconscious and less often 
consciously purposeful. That does not make it any less pernicious. Problematically, people are rarely aware 
of the actual reasons for their discrimination and will genuinely believe the race-neutral reason they create 
to mask it... Since Batson's third step hinges on credibility, this makes it very difficult to sustain a Batson 
challenge even in situations where race has in fact affected decision-making.131 
 
Here Washington’s conception of jury discrimination entered what might be considered a 
post-Batson phase, even if its jurisprudence did not yet progress correspondingly. Transcending 
Batson’s rigid focus on purposeful or conscious discrimination, the Saintcalle court recognized 
the need for a jurisprudence that recognizes the unconscious. Consider how many of the cases 
discussed in previous sections, in each of the five states studied herein, might have concluded 
differently if their judges had been watching for and rooting out unconscious discrimination. The 
State’s nine strikes of black venirepersons in Louisiana’s State v. Youngblood (2019), for 
example, were deemed free of conscious discrimination. This was itself an unpersuasive 
reading; but to find no unconscious discrimination in Youngblood would be patently naive. As for 
Saintcalle’s own case facts, the court found that despite evidence of unconscious discrimination 
- the State had again struck the venire’s sole black venireperson - the defendant’s argument 
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precluded adoption of a bright-line rule as Saintcalle had not “asked for a new standard or 
framework.” The majority concluded that the bright-line rule “must wait for another case.”132 
City of Seattle v. Erickson (2017) was that case. The State’s strike of the sole African 
American on Erickson’s venire led his counsel to petition the Washington Supreme Court to 
adopt the bright-line rule first considered in Rhone. This was the opportunity Saintcalle had 
almost, but not quite, presented. The court announced its finding in Erickson’s favor: “In the 
past, this court has provided great discretion to the trial court when it comes to the finding of a 
prima facie case pursuant to a Batson challenge. To ensure a robust equal protection guaranty, 
we now limit that discretion and adopt the bright-line Rhone rule.”133 Importantly, the bright-line 
rule is just one path strike opponents could take to proving a prima facie case. More 
conventional approaches remain available. 
While ambitious, Erickson was not the transformative leap that effectively replaced 
Batson in Washington. Comprehensive change came in the form of the Washington Supreme 
Court’s General Rule 37 (GR 37), adopted April 24, 2018. GR 37 begins its revision in section 
(c) by excising the prima facie requirement from step one.134 The strike opponent need only 
make a “simple citation to [General Rule 37]” to begin the inquiry. Section (d)’s step two asks an 
explanation of the prosecutor without any mention of race-neutrality. Step three changes 
radically in section (e): “If the court determines that an objective observer could view race or 
ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall 
be denied. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to deny the peremptory 
challenge.”135 This marks the first departure from a race-neutrality standard in jury discrimination 
inquiries. So many questionable voir dire circumstances permitted by the old framework - 
alarming numbers of African Americans struck, African Americans struck despite their similarity 
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to accepted white venirepersons, race-neutral reasons of no relevance to the instant case - 
demand a finding in the strike opponent’s favor under GR 37 (e).  
Such a departure from federal jurisprudence begs the question of whether Washington 
State has the authority to so change the federally prescribed discrimination inquiry. Recall the 
Batson Court’s own answer to this question: “In light of the variety of jury selection practices 
followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how 
best to implement our holding today.”136 States thus have broad, albeit indefinite, authority to 
interpret Batson as they deem appropriate. Instead of rejecting the original Batson inquiry as 
fatally flawed and constructing their own approaches, state judges have largely (and often 
counterproductively) used their broad interpretive authority to actualize the Court’s perceived 
intentions.137 Washington, by lightening Batson’s central burdens of proof on the strike 
opponent, has excepted itself from this trend; and, in doing so, has posited a broad reading of 
the foregoing Batson quote. While GR 37 does not unequivocally “solve jury discrimination,” it 
does ameliorate what has always been Batson’s chief fault: its overburdening of the strike 
opponent. 
GR 37 section (g), “Circumstances Considered,” further identifies five nonexclusive 
circumstances courts should consider in determining whether an objective observer could view 
the challenged peremptory strike as racially influenced: 
(i) the number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, which may include 
consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the 
prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of questions asked about it; 
 
(ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked significantly more questions or 
different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in 
contrast to other jurors; 
 
(iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers but were not the subject of a 
peremptory challenge by that party; 
 
(iv) whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race or ethnicity; and 
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(v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or 
ethnicity, in the present case or in past cases.138 
 
Section (g) thus provides the most comprehensive and specific definition available of 
what Batson referred to as a “relevant circumstance.” The circumstances most commonly 
disputed during Batson inquiries are accounted for here. Circumstances (iii) and (iv) are 
especially difficult for judges to consider in a conventional Batson inquiry, but section (g) 
requires consideration thereof. Section (h), “Reasons Presumptively Invalid,” bars seven step 
two reasons from passing muster: 
(i) having prior contact with law enforcement officers; 
 
(ii) expressing a distrust of law enforcement or a belief that law enforcement officers engage in 
racial profiling; 
 
(iii) having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a 
crime; 
 
(iv) living in a high-crime neighborhood; 
 
(v) having a child outside of marriage; 
 
(vi) receiving state benefits; and 
 
(vii) not being a native English speaker. 
 
 Other states consider step two reasons on a case-by-case basis, permitting judges to 
approve these seven. Many of these reasons have appeared in the cases discussed in previous 
sections. Applying section (g) to a case like Louisiana’s State v. Youngblood, in which 
venireperson Bourgeois expressed the distrust described in reason (ii), would have required a 
different ruling. Reason (vii), “not being a native English speaker,” notably challenges the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Hernandez v. New York (1991) that peremptory strikes may be used 
to remove non-English speaking venirepersons.139  
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One of Batson’s ambiguities is how to resolve an inquiry when the strike proponent 
alleges that the struck venireperson was inattentive, sleeping, etc., but the strike opponent and 
trial judge either dispute the allegation outright or are unsure of its veracity. (Refer to the 
discussion above of Florida’s Harriell v. State for an example.)  GR 37’s concluding section, (i) 
“Reliance on Conduct,” seeks to resolve this ambiguity: 
(i) Reliance on Conduct. The following reasons for peremptory challenges also have historically 
been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection in Washington State: allegations that the 
prospective juror was sleeping, inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact; exhibited a problematic 
attitude, body language, or demeanor; or provided unintelligent or confused answers. If any party intends 
to offer one of these reasons or a similar reason as the justification for a peremptory challenge, that party 
must provide reasonable notice to the court and the other parties so the behavior can be verified and 
addressed in a timely manner. A lack of corroboration by the judge or opposing counsel verifying the 
behavior shall invalidate the given reason for the peremptory challenge.140 
 
Before examining (i), we pause to reflect upon GR 37’s dramatic rebalance of the Batson 
framework’s burdens of proof for strike opponents and proponents. The vast majority of 
jurisdictions require the strike opponent to put forth a prima facie case and rebut the strike 
proponent’s step two strike explanation. All that these jurisdictions require of the strike 
proponent is a superficially race-neutral reason, to which trial and appellate judges usually 
defer. Unintentional discrimination is tacitly permitted. Intentional discrimination can fly under 
the radar if competently disguised. GR 37 has turned this norm on its head by dramatically 
reducing the strike opponent’s burden of proof. Strike proponents, by contrast, face the 
increased burden of proving that “an objective observer could [not] view race or ethnicity as a 
factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” Now we come to (i) itself: strike opponents may 
“veto” those peremptory strikes based on “inattentive” venireperson behavior simply by 
disputing them. Whereas strike opponents were recently all but powerless to invalidate 
peremptory strikes, now they may do so - when venireperson “inattentiveness” is concerned - 
more or less at will in Washington State. One cannot overstate Washington’s flip relative to 
conventional strike proponent-friendly inquiry procedure. We can expect backlash from those 
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who prioritize the maintenance of unchecked peremptory strikes over systemic solutions to jury 
discrimination.  
As though concerned that a general rule alone would be insufficiently compelling, the 
Washington Supreme Court further incorporated GR 37’s provisions into Washington’s common 
law in State v. Jefferson (2018). Faced with a case of likely jury discrimination before GR 37’s 
adoption, the court found that Batson in its conventional form precluded a ruling in the 
complainant’s favor. Instead, the court modified its common law Batson framework so that step 
three asks not whether the strike proponent’s reason was race-neutral but whether, as 
stipulated by GR 37 section (e), “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in 
the use of the peremptory challenge.” For statutory language to enter the common law is 
unusual. The majority bases its move (a) on the contention that “in order to meet the goals of 
Batson, we must modify the current test;” and (b) on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson that 
states may implement the framework as they see fit. Justice Madsen’s dissent lamented that the 
majority “essentially adopts GR 37 into our Batson framework, which is unnecessary and 
inappropriate. Indeed, GR 37 was never meant to be a constitutional rule backed by 
constitutional protections.”141 But Jefferson provides a failsafe for GR 37’s provisions should the 
rule be struck down; the converse also applies. It is better to enshrine constitutional 
venireperson protections in two places than one. To suggest that the rights accorded by GR 37 
are unworthy of common law protection is to underestimate the threat of jury discrimination to 
the judiciary. 
As an epilogue to Washington’s arc, we now examine GR 37’s application in a case 
decided by the Washington Supreme Court well after the rule’s adoption. In State v. Pierce 
(2020), a venireperson asked whether the State was seeking a death sentence for the 
defendant.142 The answer was no, but the trial judge responded that per the Washington 
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Supreme Court’s State v. Townsend (1994), venirepersons could not be informed whether a 
death sentence would be involved with the trial for which they might serve. The prosecutor 
posed a question to the venirepersons present for the Pierce voir dire: “[W]ith that in mind that 
the judge can’t tell you and you won't know, does that cause you any concern about being a 
juror in this case where the charge is murder in the first degree?” Venirewoman 6, the only 
African American present, expressed doubt about her ability to convict if a death sentence was 
in the cards. Defense counsel’s questioning led venirewoman 6 to explain, “I think that my views 
can be fair, and I think that they can be impartial. I am very hesitant about making a decision 
that would weigh that heavily upon somebody’s life, but I feel that I am capable of making a fa ir 
and impartial decision.” The State struck venirewoman 6 on the grounds that she “had a brother 
who was convicted of attempted murder and that the process of conviction and sentence ‘left a 
bad taste in her mouth;’” the State also “repeatedly stressed that juror 6 frequently paused 
before answering questions[.]” Pierce argued on appeal that the prosecutor had improperly 
“death-qualified” venirepersons.143  
The Washington Supreme Court, in addition to overruling the precedent that banned 
discussing death sentences with venirepersons, found that the State’s reasons for striking 
venirewoman 6 fell under General Rule 37’s presumptively invalid reasons. A venireperson’s 
aversion to the death penalty is no longer an acceptable step two explanation in Washington, as 
an objective observer could conclude that race influenced such an explanation. Consider that 
the State’s race-neutrally phrased step two explanation would have demanded a Sisyphean 
interpretive task in almost any other state. No court can ever truly determine whether a strike 
proponent acted disingenuously during voir dire; by erring on the side of caution, GR 37 spares 
courts from attempting such determinations. Any other state Supreme Court might have spent 
pages explaining why venirewoman 6’s statements could plausibly have elicited a peremptory 
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strike without any racial motive on the prosecutor’s part. (Indeed, this thesis has examined 
many such decisions.) But GR 37’s unambiguity allowed the court to explain its application of 
the rule in nine sentences. Whether Washington’s sub-Supreme appellate courts will apply the 
new rule with any regularity remains to be seen. 
Washington’s new approach to fighting jury discrimination is of national significance. We 
can expect complicated and inefficient state-level Batson frameworks to evolve as other state 
courts follow the Washington Supreme Court’s lead. One such state court, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, has already embarked on a reassessment of its Batson jurisprudence. 
Connecticut 
 Among Connecticut’s first post-Batson pronouncements on the issue of jury 
discrimination was the Connecticut Supreme Court’s State v. Gonzales (1988). Drawing from 
multiple influential opinions, the court listed six factors properly considered in determining 
pretext: 
While Batson does not address the problem of pretext, other courts have discussed the types of 
evidence that are salient to a showing of pretext. See, e.g....People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. App. 1987). The following 
examples are by no means exhaustive: (1) The reasons given for the challenge were not related to the trial 
of the case; (2) the prosecutor failed to question the challenged juror or only questioned him or her in a 
perfunctory manner; (3) prospective jurors of one race were asked a question to elicit a particular response 
that was not asked of the other jurors; (4) persons with the same or similar characteristics but not the same 
race as the challenged juror were not struck; (5) the prosecutor advanced "an explanation based on a group 
bias where the group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically"; and (6) the prosecutor 
used a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to exclude members of one race.144 
 
Here, the theme of state courts filling in Batson’s blanks recurs. Connecticut, lacking 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, was forced to develop its own list of pretexts. Given 
how early Gonzales was decided in Batson’s lifespan, Connecticut’s list is fairly comprehensive. 
A modern list of potential pretexts might also include step two strike explanations that, even if 
facially race-neutral, are associated with minorities, e.g. venireperson mistrusts police, lives in a 
high crime area, and so forth. 
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 One atypical example of possible pretext gave rise to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
State v. Edwards (2014). Pending Edwards’ trial, a venirewoman of color, C.D., wrote on her 
juror questionnaire that her race was “human.” During voir dire, the senior prosecutor asked 
C.D., “Anything in your background that would make it difficult for you to sit in judgment of other 
people?” Her response: “Besides being human, no.” C.D. explained that human beings are 
naturally informed by the diverse experiences they bring to jury service. In regard to C.D’s 
questionnaire response, the prosecutor asked, “Why did you do that?” C.D. answered, 
“Because that is the race I belong to.” The State peremptorily struck C.D. after her questioning 
concluded and, upon defense counsel’s Batson challenge, explained, “C.D.'s answer ‘seemed 
outside the norm of what one would expect to have placed in a questionnaire box, and I just 
found that to be disconcerting and didn't think that someone who would fill in... a line like that 
would necessarily be appropriate to serve as a juror.’” Further, the State “emphasized that the 
peremptory challenge had ‘nothing to do necessarily with [C.D's] race...  [but had] to do with 
[her] response to the questionnaire, which struck me… as odd… ’” Defense counsel countered 
that “he would ‘probably [have] answer[ed] [the race] question the same [way C.D. had]’ 
because ‘we're all one race,’” asking, “what is race, really?” The trial court found the State’s 
explanation “nondiscriminatory” and allowed the strike.145 
 On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, Edwards argued that by striking a 
venirewoman on the basis of her self-identified race, the State had discriminated against her; 
that the State’s explanation was pretextual because minorities are more likely to identify as 
belonging to “unusual” races, because the prosecutor questioned C.D. perfunctorily, and 
because the prosecutor’s step two explanation was irrelevant to the case; that the court should 
use its supervisory power to prohibit peremptory strikes based on responses to the race 
component of the juror questionnaire; and that the trial court had incorrectly found no evidence 
 
145 State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465 (2014). 
 
79 
of discrimination, necessitating a new trial. The State responded that the prosecutor had struck 
C.D. because her questionnaire response was itself unusual regardless of C.D.’s race. The 
court, siding with the state, used Hernandez v. New York to conclude that peremptory strikes 
based on venireperson characteristics associated with race that may impede a juror’s ability to 
decide a case impartially are nondiscriminatory. As for pretextuality, the court found that 
contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the State’s step two explanation was neither “vague” nor 
irrelevant because such an “unusual” response on a questionnaire might indicate partiality. 
Finally, the court declined to use its supervisory power as the defendant requested, on the 
ground that “the defendant presents no evidence… that our current practices result in fewer 
racial minorities participating in the jury selection process.”146 
 An individual’s racial self-identification is a proxy for or representation of their actual 
race. Exceptions arise when individuals purport to belong to ethnic groups to which they have 
no valid claim; e.g., an ethnic Brazilian could not validly claim to be an ethnic Han Chinese. 
C.D.’s response on the jury questionnaire was no such exception. Her racial self-identification, 
“human,” was as valid a view of her race as whatever finer details a DNA test might turn up. 
Individuals have a right to present their race on their terms.147 Perhaps C.D. did not want to 
share the particulars of her heritage with strangers; perhaps she took issue with conventional 
racial labels; or perhaps she did not know where her ancestors came from. Whatever the case, 
“human” represented whatever C.D.’s racial makeup might have been. Her racial self-
identification was inextricable from her race itself. As such, there was no substantive difference 
between the prosecutor’s stated basis for striking C.D. - her “unusual” racial self-identification - 
and a strike based on C.D.’s skin color. The State discriminated against C.D.’s race by proxy. 
 The prosecutor peppered his voir dire statements with the word “unusual,” and the court 
followed suit in its opinion. There could be no clearer evidence of cloaked racial bias than 
 
146 State v. Edwards. 
147 Insofar as they do not embody the aforementioned exception. 
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reference to a brown woman’s racial self-identification as “unusual.” C.D.’s questionnaire 
response might well have struck the prosecutor as “unusual” because it forced him to confront 
her race in a way that “black” or “African American” would not have. In such a case, his resulting 
discomfort could only have informed his view of C.D. and, inevitably, that view would have 
informed his strike. Such a hypothesis concerning the prosecutor’s course of action, while 
speculative, is also completely plausible. Attempting to rebut defense counsel’s assertion of 
discrimination, the prosecutor stated, “[the peremptory strike] had nothing to do necessarily with 
[C.D's] race . . . [but had] to do with [her] response to the questionnaire, which struck me . . . as 
odd . . . ." This statement is self-defeating. The questionnaire response, as a form of racial self-
identification, had everything to do with C.D.’s race. All the prosecutor proved was that he 
discriminated on the basis of C.D.’s racial identity, which no less violates the Equal Protection 
Clause than discrimination on the basis of skin color. The court, finding no fault with the 
prosecutor’s statements, ruled that the peremptory strike was based “on the unusual manner in 
which she answered a question about race in the juror questionnaire.” Yet that very “unusual 
manner,” again, reflected C.D.’s racial identity. It is farcical to hold that discrimination on the 
basis of racial identity is substantively different from discrimination on the basis of race itself, 
much less to deem such conduct acceptable. Connecticut would do well to account for racial 
identity, for in failing to acknowledge its role in Edwards, the court perpetuated a form of 
discrimination no less insidious than that based on genetics. 
Thankfully, Edwards is not representative of Connecticut’s modern Batson 
jurisprudence. State v. Holmes (2019), recently decided in the State’s favor by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, broached the issue of whether peremptory strikes made on the basis of beliefs 
common among certain minorities can be considered race-neutral. During voir dire, the State 
asked African American venireman W.T.’s about his feelings toward the criminal justice system. 
W.T., who had worked with inmates through volunteer work with the Department of Corrections, 
expressed such sentiments as “just in the criminal justice system in general, I know how 
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sometimes people are not... given a fair trial or they maybe disproportionately have to go to jail;” 
“all various systems, there's a lot of discrimination still goes out;” and “I got a new car, I feared 
that, you know, I might get stopped [by police], you know, for being black, you know.” W.T. 
indicated that he could be impartial to police testimony, and agreed with the prosecutor’s 
statement “that [he] would listen to the evidence and decide it on the evidence and you wouldn't 
let any concerns that [he] had filter in.”148 
The prosecutor peremptorily struck W.T. Defendant Holmes raised a Batson challenge 
on the grounds that “W.T. was the first African-American venireperson to be examined and 
that… W.T. had assured the court and the state that he could be a fair and impartial juror.” The 
prosecutor responded that he would have struck any venireperson who expressed W.T.’s 
beliefs regardless of their race. The trial court deemed the prosecutor’s strike facially race-
neutral and overruled the Batson challenge. On appeal, Holmes argued that peremptorily 
striking African American venirepersons who are skeptical of police is not race-neutral because 
“there is a much higher prevalence of such beliefs among African-Americans.” The Appellate 
Court rejected this “disproportionate impact” argument in light of State v. King (1999), in which 
the Connecticut Supreme Court deemed permissible a peremptory strike of an African American 
venireperson who believed that “African-American defendants often receive more sentences 
than white defendants for the same crimes.”149 
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision of Holmes, 
agreeing with the State that “disparate impact and unconscious bias claims are not cognizable 
under the second step of the Batson analysis;” and that, as ruled in King, peremptory strikes of 
African American venirepersons who express skepticism of the criminal justice system are 
facially race-neutral and therefore permissible. Hernandez v. New York (1991)’s dictum “that 
official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
 




disproportionate impact” informed the court’s decision. Despite ruling for the State, the court 
concluded that Holmes’ arguments raised serious questions about Batson’s defects, and 
referenced Washington’s General Rule 37 (GR 37) as an inspiration for assembling a Jury 
Selection Task Force to “propose necessary solutions to the jury selection process in 
Connecticut, ranging from ensuring a fair cross section of the community on the venire at the 
outset to addressing aspects of the voir dire process that diminish the diversity of juries in 
Connecticut’s state courts.”150 
Rarely do courts recognize, much less resolve to rectify, Batson’s shortcomings. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s resolution to assemble a Jury Selection Task Force recognizes 
that accumulated precedent is no substitute for a definition of “race neutral reason for striking.” 
Holmes exemplifies the ambiguity inherent to reviewing precedent alone, however dispositive 
and necessary, without a precise definition of race neutrality. Once the Task Force deliberates, 
Connecticut judges can expect definitive guidance concerning whether to permit strikes of 
venirepersons who voice W.T.’s views or variations thereon. Existing jurisprudence does not 
amount to such definitive guidance. Batson itself demanded a “neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried” at step two.151 Purkett lowered this threshold to permit “silly or 
superstitious” reasons at step two, naively trusting that “implausible or fantastic justifications 
may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination” at step three.152 
Connecticut’s State v. King (1999) narrowly considered the prosecutor’s proffered reason for 
striking in the instant case - a very similar reason to that proffered by the prosecutor in Holmes - 
without offering a definition of race-neutrality for use in future cases.153 None of these decisions 
defined race-neutrality precisely. The Holmes court addressed its state’s lack of a true definition 
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by assembling the Task Force and referencing Washington General Rule 37, which provides not 
a definition of race neutrality per se but equally valuable metrics in the form of five 
“circumstances the court should consider” “in making its determination” of whether a 
prosecutor’s proffered reason was race neutral, and seven “presumptively invalid” reasons for 
striking a venireperson.154 While Holmes does not provide a definition of race neutrality or other 
appropriate metric, its Task Force likely will.  
Though the degree to which the Task Force’s rule(s) will resemble Washington’s GR 37 
remains to be seen, application thereof to the instant case is instructive. Two of Washington’s 
“presumptively invalid” reasons for striking a venireperson are “(i) having prior contact with law 
enforcement officers;” and “(ii) expressing a distrust of law enforcement or a belief that law 
enforcement officers engage in racial profiling.” W.T.’s testimony coupled with the prosecutor’s 
stated step two response - “the concerns that I did have [were] the—the comments that—about 
[a] disproportionate amount of people being sent to jail, disproportionate amount of jail time, the 
fact that he’s had family members who have been convicted and have served time” - meet the 
criteria for presumptive invalidity under GR 37. 
Holmes’ argument that skepticism of police is a racially biased reason for a strike 
because of its prevalence in African American communities was not the most effective approach 
available in light of current Connecticut jurisprudence. Bias could have been more compellingly 
argued by presenting W.T.’s opinions as inextricable from his individual African American 
experience. Holmes in fact “emphasizes that W.T.’s ‘general concerns for his safety and 
equality as an African-American,’ on which the prosecutor relied as a race neutral explanation, 
are neither ‘unique to W.T. as an individual nor . . . a direct reflection of his personal 
experiences but, rather, a well understood reality to the majority of African-Americans.’” 
Negating the relevance of W.T.’s individual African American experience undermined Holmes’ 
 
154 The Washington section below contains further discussion of General Rule 37. 
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case. It is harder to connect a venireperson’s beliefs to an entire minority community than to that 
venireperson’s individual experience as a member thereof. Holmes proved neither that African 
Americans largely feel as W.T. does nor that all other communities feel differently.  
A more persuasive argument - again, given current Connecticut jurisprudence - might 
have highlighted that if not for W.T.’s individual experience as an African American, he would 
not have expressed such concerns as “I feared that, you know, I might get stopped, you know, 
for being black.” Such an approach would have framed W.T.’s race as a “but-for” factor that 
determined the character of his voir dire testimony. If W.T.’s skepticism of the criminal justice 
system were presented as inextricable from his individual racial experience, the prosecutor’s 
peremptory strike would have been harder to defend as race-neutral. This approach avoids the 
disproportionate impact weakness discussed in the court’s opinion. The State might have 
countered that even if W.T.’s skepticism is a product of his individual African American 
experience, the prosecutor’s strike concerned the skepticism itself and not that skepticism’s 
origin. But individual experiences beget beliefs; the two are as inextricable as race and racial 
identity. W.T. would likely have had a different perception of the criminal justice system were he 
not an African American, and the prosecutor would therefore have been less likely to strike him. 
This shortcoming in Holmes’ argument highlights a shortcoming in Batson jurisprudence 
itself: Batson challenges cannot address unintentional disproportionate impact. Unintentional 
disproportionate impact consists of systemic exclusion of minority venirepersons caused by 
peremptory strikes based on “biases” especially prevalent among certain groups. If a 
hypothetical venire consists only of African Americans who express skepticism of the criminal 
justice system and of whites who express no such skepticism, Batson permits the State to 
peremptorily strike every African American venireperson on grounds of partiality. Only 
purposeful discrimination falls under Batson’s purview. While Duren’s fair cross-section 
mandate might seem the best way to challenge disproportionate impact, Batson should also 
have this ability because a) unintentional disproportionate impact is as pernicious as “selection 
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procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries;” b) unintentional 
disproportionate impact “undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice” 
no less than said selection procedures; and c) unintentional disproportionate impact offends the 
Equal Protection Clause’s undergirding principles no less than said selection procedures.155 156 
While the court was correct to deem Holmes’ disproportionate impact argument uncompelling in 
light of current jurisprudence, a more comprehensive jurisprudence would demand 
proportionate impact. 
Holmes is, as the Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion recognized, less a definite 
example of racism pervading the courtroom than a signpost of Batson’s serious limitations.  
Our jurisprudence must address both a venireperson’s individual racial experience and the 
disproportionate impact of “bias”-based peremptory strikes on minority groups. While 
Washington’s General Rule 37 explicitly addresses neither of these issues, it resolves them by 
dramatically lowering the threshold for a finding of impermissible discrimination, purposeful or 
otherwise. Under GR 37, Holmes’ uncompelling argument would be effective as an argument 
concerned with W.T.’s individual racial experience. Should the Jury Selection Task Force decide 
not to adopt a rule like Washington’s, Connecticut defendants would be better served by the 
individual approach. 
 Less obviously, Holmes reiterates the dogma that certain beliefs are incompatible with 
jury service. Peremptory strikes effectively bar blacks and whites alike from jury service if they 
express skepticism of the criminal justice system. An entire ideological cohort thus lacks from 
our juries. Judges and attorneys guard this outcome, for they consider anti-justice system 
perspectives “partial” or “biased.” “Biased” jurors ostensibly have such a vendetta against the 
State that they cannot decide cases reasonably. These dogmas need reassessment. Our courts 
exclude “partial” jurors, yet cling to selection procedures that prioritize certain perspectives. 
 
155 Batson v. Kentucky. 
156 This is despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s chief concern with individuals as opposed to groups. 
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Such procedures are themselves irredeemably partial. To doubt the fairness of one who 
skepticizes the criminal justice system is to prejudge their reasoning faculties. A vehement 
justice system-skeptic can weigh evidence put forth by State and defendant as even-handedly 
as her punitive ideological opposite, yet voir dire advantages that opposite. Moreover, 
skepticism can be a force for progress, as it begets revision of antiquated norms. Excluding 
skeptics from any organization - governmental, corporate, nonprofit, etc. - fosters complacency 
and stagnancy. American election cycles never fail to put government-skeptics in office - why 
deny our judiciary this force for self-assessment?  
Ideological exclusion also conflicts with certain foundational legal principles. Blackstone 
stipulated that juries be “indifferently chosen;”157 exclusion of whole ideologies is hardly 
indifferent. The First Amendment prohibits the State from “abridging the freedom of speech,” yet 
our judiciary denies justice system-skeptics their constitutional right to jury service should they 
voice their convictions.158 Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) demanded juries drawn from a “fair cross-
section of the community,” yet peremptory strikes surgically exclude ideological swathes from 
that cross-section.159 The Fourteenth Amendment, from which Batson draws, demands “equal 
protection of the laws” for all citizens, with no exception for those of certain persuasions.160 The 
judiciary can better embody these principles by prohibiting belief-based exclusion except in 
those rare instances where a venireperson professes an ability to be impartial. 
Connecticut’s reform effort is likely the first of many. That unconscious discrimination 
was so central to the Holmes decision is especially encouraging. Whatever the Task Force’s 
decision, we can take heart that jury discrimination reform’s long hibernation is over.  
 
 
157 Congressional Research Service, (n.d.). “Right to Trial by Impartial Jury.” Retrieved from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-6/right-to-trial-by-impartial-jury. 
158 U.S. Constitution Amend. I 
159 Taylor v. Louisiana. 
160 U.S. Constitution Amend. XIV 
 
87 
A Member of Connecticut’s Jury Selection Task Force Weighs In 
Connecticut Appellate Court Judge Douglas Lavine, appointed in 2006, is a member of 
the Jury Selection Task Force organized by the state’s Supreme Court in its recent State v. 
Holmes (2019) opinion.161 Judge Lavine authored a concurring opinion for State v. Holmes at 
the appellate level, arguing that although “the peremptory challenge [in question] was properly 
exercised under prevailing law and practices… Connecticut should reform its jury selection 
process to eliminate the perverse way in which Batson has come to be used.” He kindly agreed 
to an interview concerning Batson reform. Drawn from decades of experience with the Batson 
framework, Judge Lavine’s insights have proven instrumental to this thesis. Note that his 
statements do not represent the Connecticut Judicial Branch. 
 The most fundamental question before Connecticut’s Jury Selection Task Force is what 
substantive Batson reform should look like. Options abound: the state might reduce the number 
of peremptory strikes available to counsel during voir dire, create an entirely new framework, 
abolish the peremptory strike, or adopt a version of Washington State’s General Rule 37. Judge 
Lavine, who “[does] not favor abolishing peremptory challenges,” averred that “Rule 37 in 
Washington provides a good framework for an approach.”162 Implementing a version of GR 37 in 
Connecticut would require that judges determine at step three whether an “objective observer 
could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory [strike].”163 Certain step two 
explanations, such as a venireperson’s negative experiences with police, would be 
“presumptively invalid.” Judge Lavine “generally [agrees] with this approach but [is] open to 
hearing arguments for and against.” He predicts that presumptive invalidity “will be the subject 
of vigorous discussion and debate among members of the jury task force.” Importantly, Judge 
 
161 This section assumes familiarity with State v. Holmes, which I discuss in the Connecticut section 
above. 
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Lavine considers a “red line approach,” like GR 37, “the only solution that is practical and 
predictable.”164 
 Judge Lavine touched on several specialized areas of Batson jurisprudence, among 
them sua sponte Batson challenges. A sua sponte Batson challenge, established in Illinois’ 
jurisprudence by People v. Rivera (2007) and in Washington by GR 37, consists of a judge 
challenging a potentially discriminatory peremptory strike when opposing counsel fails to do so. 
In Judge Lavine’s experience, sua sponte Batson challenges are rarely necessary, as “if a 
lawyer were attempting to use a peremptory challenge in an improper way, there is a 99.99 
percent likelihood that opposing counsel would object.” Consequently, judges need rarely resort 
to sua sponte intervention. This reasoning confirms that, at least in Connecticut, attorneys use 
Batson reliably when voir dire sessions concern them. Hypothetically, “if [Judge Lavine] had a 
firm belief that a lawyer was attempting to use a peremptory challenge for an improper reason—
based on race, gender, gender expression, national origin, and other similar categories— and 
opposing counsel just sat there like the prototypical potted plant, [he] would in all likelihood ask 
counsel if he intended to object, which would almost certainly prompt an objection.” In other 
words, Judge Lavine would prompt a Batson-shy attorney to challenge a plainly suspicious 
strike. Such is, however, “a very theoretical discussion in [his] view.”165 
 Judge Lavine also discussed the respective burdens of proof for strike opponents and 
proponents. Recall that in most jurisdictions, strike proponents carry the burden of proving that a 
given strike had a race-neutral basis, while strike opponents must advance and prove a prima 
facie case of discrimination; Batson itself demands that the opponent prove an “inference of 
discrimination.”166 Connecticut has lightened the strike opponent’s burden by removing the step 
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jurisprudence’s “present incarnation, the burdens are appropriately apportioned.” Connecticut 
needs neither lighten nor expand the burden of proof for either the strike opponent or proponent 
per this view. Judge Lavine added, “if a Rule 37 approach were adopted in Connecticut, of 
course, that would eliminate such concerns in a significant proportion of cases.”167 Indeed, by 
lowering the threshold for a strike to be ruled discriminatory, GR 37 mooted many concerns 
about burden imbalance. 
 Batson has come under fire in recent years for failing to address unconscious bias. 
Though genuinely racist strike proponents are increasingly less common, unconscious bias can 
still cause counsel to unwittingly factor race into peremptory strikes. GR 37’s drafters responded 
by eliminating the need for strike opponents to prove intentional discrimination. Judge Lavine 
would like to see Connecticut respond as well, stating, “[A]s Batson presently functions, it does 
not do enough to address the problems of unconscious bias and the subtlety of racism.” One 
thorny obstacle to tackling unconscious bias is the difficulty judges face in accusing attorneys of 
racism. As Judge Lavine put it, “Not only is it impossible to prove [conscious or unconscious 
racism], but on a human level, in a courtroom, usually the judges know the lawyers… The judge 
has to be willing to brand the prosecutor as a racist [in order to deny a peremptory strike].”168 
Judges can hardly be faulted for reluctance to denounce their colleagues. Any new Batson 
jurisprudence must allow judges to rule in the strike opponent’s favor without causing 
professional friction. GR 37’s approach, allowing judges to deny a peremptory strike on the 
ground that an objective observer - not necessarily the judge herself - could view race as a 
factor, may thwart unconscious bias without forcing judges to insinuate racism. 
 Before Connecticut’s Jury Selection Task Force lies both a range of problems and an 
array of promising solutions. Judge Lavine’s comprehensive knowledge thereof, and his 
openness to hearing the gamut of proposals, reflect well on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
 




choice of Task Force members. I encourage those invested in the battle against jury 




























 Too many Americans lump jury service in with such civic chores as filing taxes and 
visiting the DMV. Temporary confinement to a courthouse cuts into precious time that might 
otherwise be spent on work or recreation. Alas, these attitudes divert popular and academic 
attention from the danger jury discrimination poses to enforcement of this vital constitutional 
right. I need not remind the reader why jury discrimination is so profoundly dangerous to our 
carefully balanced republic, but will do so anyway.  
The lay citizen has little edifying interaction with government beyond public school. 
Justified skepticism of elected officials suppresses voter turnout, to say nothing of suppressive 
voter qualification laws. The safety net’s noble purpose does not slacken the stress of, say, 
applying for food stamps. Police have yet to move past racial profiling. But jury service is 
different. Sitting among one’s peers, exercising one’s critical thinking faculties for the public 
good, holding another’s legal fate in one’s hands: from this experience jurors learn compassion, 
cooperative skills, and, crucially, that engagement with one’s society is not tedious but 
rewarding. Our market culture emphasizes detached personal gain over such meaningful 
engagement. We cannot afford to neglect as rich a source of interpersonal edification as jury 
service. 
Jury discrimination, with the limited Duren and Batson as its unintended enablers, is just 
such a form of neglect. Too many venirepersons, especially minorities, are denied not only their 
constitutional rights but also the aforedescribed edification jury service offers. No wonder 
minority venirepersons so often express skepticism of the judicial process - it has excluded their 
fellows since its inception! Proof of jury discrimination’s rampancy can be found in almost any 
one of the cases included in this thesis. There is no pretending that the fair cross-section 
requirement is met with acceptable frequency - it cannot be, when peremptory strikes remove 
so many qualified venirepersons. The potential consequences are grave. Conscious or 
unconscious, jury discrimination seeds low public opinion of the judiciary and, indeed, of our 
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society as a whole. Low public opinion begets charges of illegitimacy, from which instability 
follows. As importantly, defendants suffer when jury discrimination goes unnoticed or 
unopposed. An ideologically homogenous jury has no impetus to scrutinize its preconceptions. 
By contrast, a diverse jury enjoys diverse perspectives, and thus reaches a more informed 
verdict. Minority defendants especially benefit from diverse juries, for an all-white jury has all the 
less incentive to put itself in minority shoes.  
State and federal courts have not addressed jury discrimination in tandem. Existing 
literature has documented federal stagnancy. Meanwhile, as this thesis has explored, the states 
have a mixed track record of interpreting and implementing Duren and Batson. Decisions in the 
vein of Louisiana’s State v. Youngblood outnumber those like Connecticut’s State v. Holmes. 
Still, the latter offers hope that nascent reforms will spur a national movement. Federal judges 
need to add their voices, for state courts cannot complete the task of reform on their own. Let us 
hope that the U.S. Supreme Court will issue a decision more meaningful than the retread that 
was Flowers v. Mississippi. Critically, Duren and Batson are two halves of a whole, and both 
require attention. Most jury discrimination reform in the state courts has dealt with Batson. I saw 
fit to devote a chapter each to reformed and non-reformed state-level Batson jurisprudences, 
but state-level Duren jurisprudence remains underdeveloped enough that a single chapter 
sufficed. State and federal courts are overdue to reassess and strengthen Duren’s aging yet 
essential ruling on how juries are to be drawn. Keeping demographic records is an ideal place to 
start. 
Attachment to the peremptory strike and to outmoded methods of jury selection is 
reform’s chief obstacle. Too many legal minds are more concerned with keeping the peremptory 
strike fully peremptory, and averting the expense of reconfiguring jury selection models, than 
with enforcing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judges and attorneys must recognize 
that full protection of venirepersons’ and defendants’ rights is requisite to the continued 
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